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ARTICLES
Regleprudence—at OIRA and Beyond
NESTOR M. DAVIDSON & ETHAN J. LEIB*
There are significant domains of legality within the administrative state that
are mostly immune from judicial review and have mostly escaped the attention
of legal theorists. Although administrative law generally focuses on the products of agency action as they are reviewed by the judiciary, there are important
aspects of regulatory activity that are legal in nature but rarely interrogated by
systematic analysis with reference to accounts about the role and nature of law.
In this Article, we introduce a category of analysis we call “regleprudence,” a
sibling of jurisprudence and legisprudence. Once we explore some regleprudential norms, we delve into a case study—the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and the legal work it undertakes through regulatory review. We then
suggest how more general attention to regleprudence can improve our understanding of important corners of the Executive Branch.
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INTRODUCTION
Jurisprudence and legisprudence have had their days in the sun.1 Yet so much
of law in its daily working—authoritative decisions by government officials
with binding public policymaking functions—remains immune from systematic
analysis. Of course, what scholars and lawyers call “administrative law” shines
much light into the labyrinthine regulatory state. The subject has long explored
ways that many governmental decisions neither judicial nor legislative can be
thought of as law and need to be controlled through procedural and substantive
oversight, often by judges and sometimes through structural design. There
remain, however, significant domains of lawmaking in the administrative state
that continue to be hidden from view. Leveraging recent work on the role of

1. For a discussion of the development of “legisprudence” as a conceptual frame distinct from
jurisprudence, see Julius Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886 (1950).
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precedent in the Federal Executive Branch,2 we focus on the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) nestled within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that oversees federal regulatory activity,3 to introduce
and explore some foundational questions of what we call “regleprudence”: the
systematic analysis of regulation refracted through accounts of the role and
nature of law.4
OIRA is a ripe case study for the development of the metes and bounds of
regleprudence. This once-obscure institution has received substantial attention
recently by legal scholars and political scientists,5 with academics and practitioners beginning a conversation about how to link theories of regulation with the
institutional design of regulatory review and oversight outside the courts. In this
discourse, OIRA’s work of centralized regulatory review is rarely understood to
be jurisgenerative, in part because its role in the Executive Branch is not subject
to direct judicial review. But it is becoming increasingly clear that this is no
longer a tenable way to think about the office, for OIRA practices law (even
though it is staffed mostly by nonlawyers). Much of the oversight process by
OIRA and the larger OMB bureaucracy in which the office sits is a de facto
layer of lawmaking.6 This is not to diminish from OIRA’s role in aggregating
dispersed information across the Executive Branch and serving as the locus of
“alternative dispute resolution” among agencies, and between agencies and the

2. See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1448 (2010); Mark Tushnet, Legislative and Executive Stare Decisis, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1339
(2008); see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 111–12 (2008).
3. OIRA was created by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2012)), but its core raison d’être derives from a
series of executive orders on regulatory review put in place by successive presidents since the Reagan
Administration. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866
§ 11, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 806 (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866,
3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06 (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,563,
3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816–17 (2012).
4. This is a reworking of a standard definition of “legisprudence” from WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 587 n.a. (4th ed. 2007).
5. See, e.g., Alex Acs & Charles M. Cameron, Does White House Regulatory Review Produce a
Chilling Effect and “OIRA Avoidance” in the Agencies?, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 443 (2013);
Christopher DeMuth, OIRA at Thirty, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 101 (2011); Michael A. Livermore, CostBenefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 609 (2014); Michael A. Livermore &
Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013);
Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755 (2013); Cass
R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013); Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994 (2011).
6. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325 (2014) [hereinafter
Heinzerling, Inside EPA] (highlighting that OIRA has the capacity to displace statutory means and
ends); Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097
(2006) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation] (same). OMB has a general counsel’s office in
recognition that law is made there every day, but beyond that office, hundreds of non-attorney line
officers in constant communication with federal agencies are in the business of making law.
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White House.7 Of course there are ways to supervise and manage an agency’s
rulemaking that fall shy of “law.” OIRA, however, regularly decides a variety of
legal questions, such as the proper parameters for cost–benefit analysis and
notice-and-comment requirements throughout the administrative state, that
have coercive impact on citizens’ daily lives.8 And the office likewise plays a
sometimes-decisive role in interpreting statutory, constitutional, and treaty questions.9 It is thus necessary to do more to establish how OIRA exercises this
lawmaking function and how the office should treat the law it is making.10
Several critical inquiries have informed our research, including: How do staff
within OIRA approach the question of precedent in, for example, interpreting
Executive Orders 12,866 and 13,563, which structure OIRA’s authority? Is there
an “administrative common law” on questions such as what constitutes a
“significant regulatory action” under the relevant executive orders, or is drawing
the boundaries of OIRA’s jurisdiction routinely a “political” decision? How
does office staff take into account past OIRA practice more generally? Is
practice memorialized on these questions, as occurs in the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) within the Justice Department?11 If there is a body of precedent,
is it communicated to agencies in some way or does it arise only in the process
of individual regulatory reviews? Does OIRA produce some corollary of “interpretive regulations” that further define the operative terms in the executive
orders? If so, through what process? Do occasional letters from OIRA Administrators amount to a “common law”?12 Assuming OIRA is not merely a place to
sanitize brute political oversight of the administrative state, what are the norms
of legality that constrain OIRA review?13

7. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1840 (“Outside of the White House, numerous agencies are also
involved, and they may well be the driving forces in the process that is frequently misdescribed as
‘OIRA review.’ It would not be excessive to describe OIRA as, in large part, an information aggregator.”).
8. See infra sections II.B.1–2.
9. See infra section II.B.3.
10. As we discuss below, see infra section II.A, this legal function has long raised concerns about
the proper allocation of delegated authority to interpret statutes within the Executive Branch. In 1981,
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel opined that OIRA’s oversight of the regulatory
process should be understood not to “include authority to reject an agency’s ultimate judgment,
delegated to it by law, that potential benefits outweigh costs, that priorities under the statute compel a
particular course of action, or that adequate information is available to justify regulation.” Memorandum from Larry L. Simms, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to David Stockman,
Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation” 64 (Feb. 13,
1981), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1981/02/31/op-olc-v005p0059.pdf.
11. For details about OLC’s memoranda on stare decisis, see Morrison, supra note 2, at 1452–53.
12. See infra sections II.C and III.A (discussing OIRA return, review, and prompt letters, and
trans-substantive memoranda).
13. Any discussion of OIRA as a lawmaking institution begs the predicate question of whether we
have a theory of “law” to defend that description. This is a thicket that raises many interesting
questions, but we are operating in what might be described as a defensible heartland. As we spell out,
OIRA is deeply engaged in interpreting legal documents, enforcing the commands of statutes and
executive orders, and even applying treaties and foreign affairs doctrines. See infra section II.B.
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These descriptive questions about OIRA also inform our normative inquiries
into what would be a desirable system for disclosure, transparency, and use of
precedent. Administrative law has for ages sought to articulate principles of
judicial review of agency action;14 regleprudence focuses instead on immanent
concerns of legality that ought to structure administrative action even in the
absence of that judicial oversight. Regleprudence focuses on law internal to the
administrative state that is something more than mere politics or convention.15
And we focus on stare decisis first—treating like cases alike—because it is
often called “the most basic principle of jurisprudence,”16 with transparency
operating as a counterbalance, necessitating reason-giving about departures
from precedent.17
The descriptive and normative questions we ask of OIRA limn the contours
of regleprudence, and their answers have consequences for a much broader
array of administrative practice. As to OIRA, regleprudential commitments to
core rule-of-law values of consistency and transparency can help ground a
reform agenda for the office.18 Perhaps because OIRA does not have a long
tradition of articulated reason-giving, inquiries into stare decisis and the alternative legitimating function of transparency are especially pressing in this context.

Whatever the conceptual outer bounds of regleprudence beyond OIRA—which we hope will be fertile
ground for future scholarship—the descriptive reality is that the case for OIRA as a legal institution is
relatively straightforward. As to the deeper jurisprudential issues about how to draw the concept of law
here, see infra section IV.B.
14. See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 940–41 (2011) (arguing that the “body
of jurisprudence we know as administrative law” is built “on the appellate review model of the
relationship between reviewing courts and agencies,” and tracing the history of that understanding of
administrative law).
15. Conventions are a set of practices within the Executive Branch that have the property of regular
observance but probably come shy of being treated by decision makers as law. See generally Adrian
Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013). These conventions
are, Vermeule argues, more than politics but less than law. Id. at 1181–94. Our argument for
regleprudence is, in part, an effort to theorize about the more law-like side of conventions that are, in
Vermeule’s terminology, “moral constraints.” Id. at 1189 (emphasis omitted). The regularity observed
with respect to these constraints is not, we assert, a product of a “poorly understood” “psychological
process[]” of “normative internalization,” id. at 1189–90, but flows from the logic of legality. Once it
becomes clear that law is happening, behavioral regularity—precedent formation—follows.
16. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).
17. Michael Livermore recently described the process of precedent within the bureaucracy at OIRA:
Given the many pressing demands faced by agencies and OIRA, and the need to avoid
constant seeking of direction from political leadership, risk-averse and resource-conscious
managers are likely to frown on attempts to raise issues that have already been dealt with in
the past. If a prior decision can be cited as controlling the current matter, internal bureaucratic
forces are likely to encourage that it govern, absent a compelling reason to revisit the matter.
Livermore, supra note 5, at 623. Livermore then makes the analogy to courts in a footnote. Id. at
623 n.60.
But notice Livermore’s framing of the use of precedent here: it is wholly instrumental and generated
from the sociology of organizations (and the risks they create). Our hope is to focus on the use of
precedent as a legal mechanism not just as a feature of managing bureaucracies.
18. See infra section III.B.
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We thus endeavor to show what a focus on regleprudence can do to improve
the process and substance of regulatory review, better calibrating political
accountability and dynamic flexibility with the benefits of a deeper commitment
to norms of legality.19
Ultimately, although we focus on OIRA as a case study, the analytic and
normative efforts here should pay dividends throughout the work of the Executive Branch. All folkways and norms of agency practice that have real lawmaking functions (even when not otherwise controlled by the tentacles of
administrative law proper) might usefully be seen through the lens we develop
here. A new regleprudence has the potential to promote stability, accountability,
and rule of law within the entire administrative state. By calibrating the
rule-of-law values once illuminated by jurisprudence and legisprudence to the
specific context of the administrative state, regleprudence promises a study of
legality within a sphere that balances politics, deliberation, transparency, and
consistency differently than its forbearers. Only by understanding that unique
site for legality can we hope to make progress in thinking about how and
whether stare decisis and other foundations of legal legitimacy ought to be
given expression and respect within the regulatory state. That is regleprudence’s
agenda.
***
Our Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we explain why regleprudence as a
research agenda for legal scholars could be illuminating. By drawing on the
development of legisprudence and recent scholarly focus on precedent’s function within the Executive Branch, we highlight the importance of sketching
analytic principles for regleprudence and distinguish the domain of regleprudence from administrative law (perhaps overdrawing the distinction to render
salient some unique features of the domain of regleprudence). In Part II, we turn
to OIRA, outlining the myriad ways in which the office is engaged in core
questions of procedural and substantive law. We also offer an empirical analysis
of a little-studied repository of published OIRA comments to agencies, a rare
glimpse inside the black box of OIRA’s regulatory review. In Part III, we
address a series of questions about how OIRA might function in a landscape
more attentive to appropriate regleprudential priorities, focusing in particular on
the function of stare decisis and transparency across the modalities of law-

19. In suggesting a recalibration of precedent, transparency, and other rule-of-law values within
OIRA, we recognize that there are costs as well as benefits to this shift. Indeed, at a time when critics
are excoriating OIRA for its anti-regulatory bias and the ossification of regulatory review, see, e.g., Lisa
Heinzerling, Who Will Run the EPA?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 39 (2013), jreg.commons.yale.edu/files/
2013/03/Heinzerling-EPA5.pdf; Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992), it is fair to argue that more transparency and disclosure would
simply raise additional frictions. However, there is a difference between improving the structure of
regulatory review and adding costs to individual instances of oversight, and we are advocating the
former in the hope of improving the latter. See infra section III.B.3.
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making evident in OIRA’s work. Finally, in Part IV, we conclude by tracing the
broader implications of our project, empirically and conceptually.
I. WHY REGLEPRUDENCE?
In formulating the research agenda we aim to establish here, three foundational points are in order. Section I.A traces how we arrive at the concept of
“regleprudence” from its forbearer in legisprudence and from legisprudence’s
points of departure from jurisprudence. Legisprudence was conceived to move
legal theorists away from the judiciary as the primary expositor of law, emphasizing statutes as an equally legitimate source of legal authority. Although administrative law recognizes that agencies make law, regleprudence adds Executive
Branch lawmaking beyond those realms specifically policed by judicial oversight as no less important for legal scholars to include in theories of law.
Section I.B explains why regleprudence is not simply a fancy way of talking
about old administrative law themes. And section I.C lays the groundwork for
the discussion to follow: we preview the role that stare decisis can play in legal
institutions outside the courts as a way to craft a regleprudential lens into the
particular bureaucracy we explore in Part II.
A. FROM LEGISPRUDENCE TO REGLEPRUDENCE

It is worth beginning by briefly reviewing why anyone thought we needed a
category of “legisprudence” when we were seemingly doing just fine as legal
scholars with conventional studies of jurisprudence.20 For that story, one has to
revisit Julius Cohen’s classic, Towards Realism in Legisprudence.21 The seeds
of regleprudence become apparent when we explore the etiology of Cohen’s
departure from jurisprudence in the first instance.
Some might think of legisprudence as merely another name for studying
court decisions about statutory interpretation; it seems common enough to use
the term as a stand-in for statutory interpretation theory.22 But its original

20. Jurisprudence, of course, is itself a contested terrain. Here, we primarily use the term “jurisprudence” with a distinctly American accent, focusing on accounts and fundamental features of adjudication. However, the broader technical, academic understanding of jurisprudence—theoretical debates
about the concept of law most generally—have deep significance for regleprudence (and likely vice
versa). See infra section IV.B.
21. See generally Cohen, supra note 1.
22. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a Jurisprudence
of Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865, 867–69 (2013); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (1990); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using the
Evidence Course as a Vehicle for Teaching Legisprudential Skills, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 907, 910, 915
(2003). Others have different usages of the term. See, e.g., Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule
for Congress, 76 MO. L. REV. 135, 140 n.26 (2011) (“My use of the term ‘legisprudence’ is different
from that of William Eskridge, who uses the word to refer to the subset of jurisprudence that deals with
the way judges should interpret statutes (i.e. statutory interpretation). I use the term to refer to theories
about how legislators should make law.” (citation omitted)).
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ambition was somewhat grander.23 Cohen sought nothing less than “a working
partnership between ethics and science” in the domain of “legislative policymaking.”24 Admittedly, this gambit was taken against a background of a deeply
realist way of thinking about judicial decisionmaking. But Cohen was also
writing at a time when lawyers had “the ingrained habit of regarding law as
genuine only if it is labelled ‘judge-made.’”25 So it seemed necessary to remind
people that law was made, deliberated about, and implemented outside of
courts. He wanted “no longer [to] give continued support to the ‘monopoly of
the judicial point of view.’”26
Once Cohen made the (probably banal to modern eyes) observation that law
is made outside the courts,27 he proceeded to attempt to evaluate and constrain
the forms of decisionmaking utilized by “Congress, . . . the state legislatures,
. . . municipal councils, [and] administrative tribunals.”28 Just as some realists
(or those resisting them) tried to find ways to constrain judicial decisionmaking
through ethics and science, Cohen saw that there was a need to do the same in
the domain of legislative decisionmaking. To be sure, people are somewhat less
disturbed by realism with respect to legislatures than they are about realism
with respect to judges; but even in legislatures, legal principles must constrain
lawmaking. Hence, legisprudence.29
The administrative state, too, requires systematic analysis with reference to
the role and nature of law, although the case for it must be differently calibrated
than it is for legislatures.30 In some respects, the radical realism expected of
political actors at the legislative level (republican theories requiring all legislators to seek the public good, notwithstanding)31 makes the requirement for

23. To be fair, even Cohen showed signs of limiting his earlier ambitions when revisiting legisprudence three decades after his mission statement. See generally Julius Cohen, Legisprudence: Problems
and Agenda, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1163 (1983).
24. Cohen, supra note 1, at 887 (emphasis omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 888.
27. To be sure, even this observation could be missed by many first-year law students who continue
to develop their lawyering skills largely through common law classes and excessive attention to
appellate judges. See generally Ethan J. Leib, Adding Legislation Courses to the First-Year Curriculum,
58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 166 (2008) (arguing that the first-year curriculum ought to include a course on
legislation and regulation).
28. Cohen, supra note 1, at 887.
29. See generally id. Although the reference to “administrative tribunals” in Cohen’s early articulation might suggest that regleprudence was already contemplated by Cohen, all of Cohen’s case studies
that followed were in the domain of legislation. Indeed, in Cohen’s later exploration of the “problems
and agenda” for legisprudence, the administrative state wasn’t much present at all. See generally
Cohen, supra note 23.
30. Ed Rubin might say that all legislative and regulatory work is “policy and implementation,” so
the same kinds of inquiries might be necessary at the legislative and regulatory levels: it is all policy
science. See generally EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE
MODERN STATE (2005). But since we have different expectations of ethics and science in the different
instrumentalities of governance, individualized attention seems well advised.
31. One of us has developed arguments for constraining legislators through principles of ethical
representation, which require pursuit of the public good. See generally Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet,
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constraining principles of legality essential—but also natural and obvious. The
administrative state is not as easy to reconcile with standard legisprudential
concerns with controlling and channeling politics because it is most generally
justified and legitimated through appeals to delegation and expertise.32 These
structural differences between legislators and administrators highlight why the
animating principles and attendant practices of legisprudence and regleprudence
might need to differ too.
Tethering legisprudential principles and constraints to actors to whom they
are not expected to apply therefore seems ill-advised. Although there is an
ineliminable flow of politics coursing through the veins of the administrative
state (at OIRA and in the agencies it oversees), conventional political checks of
elections or indirect checks like the “unitary executive thesis”—the notion that
the President is supposed to control policymaking in the entire administrative
state—do not justify the importation of principles of legisprudence down into
the daily lawmaking within the regulatory agencies; they call for their own
principles of legality.
In articulating the concept of legisprudence, Cohen wanted to help legislators
learn and take seriously nonpolitical “facts,” and he wanted legislators to
develop legal thinking that was not merely responsive to what a court might say.
Ultimately, most modern commentators have similar hopes for nonpolitical fact
gathering in our administrative agencies—and for agencies’ serious engagement
with law that is not wholly generated from courts’ pronouncements. But the
challenges to achieve these desiderata in the administrative state differ from the
more purely legislative arena: accountability, mission, role, and deliberative
structures all differ, militating towards a regleprudence that is inspired by
Cohen’s call but is applied in an area that is not always understood as a locus of
lawmaking. If anything, attention to norms of legality is even more urgent
within the administrative state than in the legislature, with its direct democratic
legitimacy. Nor must one have as realist a starting point as Cohen’s to see the
urgency of nonpolitical facts as the center of what ought to be driving the
administrative state’s expert work.
At the conceptual level, it may be that the same underlying questions
supervene over jurisprudence, legisprudence, and regleprudence: What is law?

Fiduciary Representation and Deliberative Engagement with Children, 20 J. POL. PHIL. 178 (2012);
Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law,
126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91 (2013); Michael Serota & Ethan J. Leib, The Political Morality of Voting in
Direct Democracy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1596 (2013).
32. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Of
course, judicial review was sometimes thought to provide legitimation to the administrative state as
well. See generally DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN
AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014); LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965)
(arguing that judicial review is a “necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of
administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid”). But as with Chevron’s once
popular theory of legitimation through the democratic accountability of agencies, these other legitimation themes seem secondary to (or subsumed by) expertise and congressional delegation.
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Who should be making it? Through what procedures? Who has authority to
decide what? How ought previous legal decisions be treated by future lawmakers? How much candor and transparency is appropriate? Are political
considerations appropriate to legal decisionmaking? But because the institutional actors that are the subjects of the theories have such different responsibilities within the tapestry of modern government, regleprudence will enable
scholars and lawyers to focus on the unique kind of policymaking occurring in
less obvious parts of modern lawmaking, which students of bureaucracy usually
study more carefully than lawyers do.
B. ISN’T REGLEPRUDENCE LESS AWKWARDLY CALLED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW?

Even if readers have followed us this far, an obvious question presents
itself: Why isn’t “regleprudence” just swallowed by administrative law? Since
the kinds of descriptive and normative inquiries likely to arise in regleprudence as the field develops will primarily be taken up by administrative lawyers,
will likely be studied in administrative law courses, and will, to some extent,
play themselves out within the doctrines and processes of administrative law,
what work is done by isolating regleprudence for sustained attention?
In the first place, identifying and explicating the legal core of the administrative state’s activities still seems urgent. The disadvantage of assuming
administration and implementation is “technical” rather than legal tends to
distract attention from the ways in which the administrative state’s instrumentalities are sources of coercion in the daily lives of citizens.33 From that
coercion flows the need for a justificatory and legitimating framework; regleprudence invites this focus. Surely, this theorizing will find a home in administrative law.34 Rules and adjudications are sufficiently legally oriented to have
already gained the attention of administrative law scholars. But highlighting regleprudence’s continuity with developed principles of jurisprudence
and legisprudence more neatly emphasizes its deep tie to theories of law in
particular.35
Although administrative law—the doctrines controlling the judicial review of
the administrative state’s processes and substantive decisions—should clearly
be informed by regleprudential concerns, these central issues are too often
secreted off in favor of doctrinal and positive questions about particular organic

33. In Sunstein’s recent article on OIRA, he uses the term “technical” twenty-three times in
thirty-eight pages to describe the work done at the office. Sunstein, supra note 5. The word “technical”
seems used to assuage us that the work is not lawmaking.
34. The closest category in the standard administrative law casebooks is “legal regularity,” though it
is unfortunately embedded within a discussion of the scope of judicial review. See, e.g., PETER L.
STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 928–38 (11th ed.
2011).
35. Although it may be hard to find people these days who would deny with a straight face that
agencies make law, it wasn’t always so. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975).
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statutes, the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),36 or other
structural or constitutional requirements of notice or due process. And regleprudential values are no doubt articulated by courts all the time, albeit crafted in a
manner that presupposes the centrality of processes and decisions that can be
reviewed by the judiciary. If legisprudence taught us anything, it taught us how
to think about law without thinking like a court.
The realm of regleprudence, moreover, can encompass a variety of domains
within the Executive Branch that administrative law tends to discount because
they do not reflect final agency action subject to judicial review, in APA terms.37
Administrative agencies engage in a wide variety of interpretive tasks—through
guidelines, policy statements, opinion letters, manuals, circulars, and other
avenues—that are not, in a formal sense, binding on the general public.38 This
often internally facing work of agencies nonetheless often operates in distinctly
law-like ways, and can control agency actors and those who rely on them even
if they are not (again as a formal matter) directly applicable to the general
public or enforceable in court. And there are a number of institutions within the
Executive Branch—including OIRA, the subject of our case study, but many
others as well—that similarly are discounted in administrative law scholarship
in the distinctively legal work they undertake because such work is subsidiary
to final agency action subject to judicial review.39 To wit, direct presidential
action is excluded from APA review because courts have decided that the
President is not an agency.40 Yet executive orders and signing statements issued

36. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
37. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”). Indeed,
administrative law scholars argue that delegated agency authority in the realm of rulemaking is only
legitimate to the extent that it is judicially reviewable. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Legislation That
Isn’t—Attending to Rulemaking’s “Democracy Deficit,” 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1351, 1357 (2010).
38. See generally Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals,
and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992).
Much ink—judicial and scholarly—has been spilt on the question whether a given agency pronouncement is binding on the public or falls outside the APA’s requirements for notice and comment because
they are, in the APA’s terms, “interpretative rules,” “general statements of policy,” or come within other
APA exceptions. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law,
64 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 569–85 (2012); David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and
the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 282–89 (2010); William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1322–23 (2001). That there is a realm of nonbinding agency action
that is often understood to stand outside the formal bounds of administrative procedure does not mean
that that realm does not possess important legal characteristics in many instances. On the other hand,
we are not arguing that all agency action is necessarily sufficiently jurisgenerative to warrant examination in regleprudential terms. Much of what agencies and other Executive Branch institutions do in their
day-to-day work is genuinely ministerial or technical.
39. We explore these and a number of other domains in greater depth after our case study on OIRA
has set the framework for a regleprudential perspective. See infra section IV.A.
40. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 470 (1994); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796
(1992).
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by the White House might be usefully viewed through a regleprudential lens.
Other similar Executive Branch domains abound.41
A new conceptual framework under the banner of regleprudence, then, could
supplement dominant modes of exploring lawmaking in the administrative
state—and take as its first point of departure that the administrative state
sometimes makes law throughout the Executive Branch, even when this law is
not subject to judicial review most of the time. The fact that much of what
regleprudence takes as its subject matter is not subject to routine judicial
oversight does not, however, make it any less legal. That is not an embarrassment to the constitutional lawmaking of Schoolhouse Rock.42 Rather, it is
starting from where legisprudential theory left off: just as legal theorists needed
to move off the judiciary as the sole source of law and welcome statutory law
into the theoretical and practical core of what counts as law, so do we now need
to move off thinking of the legislature and judiciary as exclusive sources of law
and judicial oversight as the sine qua non of legality within the Executive
Branch.
C. A PREFACE TO A STUDY OF STARE DECISIS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Once the concessions just outlined are made, which we expect few will
reasonably reject, our first order of business is squarely on the table. If the
internal workings of the administrative state are law, to what extent must they
be rendered consistent with traditional rule-of-law values: consistency, predictability, transparency, and perhaps even, to return to Cohen’s starting point,
rationality? This inquiry welcomes a brief discussion about the potential role of
stare decisis within the Executive Branch.
It is not entirely clear, to begin, that there should be a role for stare decisis
within the workings of the Executive Branch. After all, although stare decisis
seems essential to the rule of law in courts,43 it might not be a general feature of
the rule of law outside the judiciary. Indeed, Mark Tushnet goes further: “It
seems obvious to me that stare decisis is not an essential aspect of the rule of
law generally: legislatures can radically change the law or repeal entire bodies
of law without offending rule-of-law principles. The rule-of-law justification of
stare decisis therefore must be confined to the judicial practice.”44 The role of
the Executive is so tied up with the promise of energetic discretion and
responsive politics that it is perhaps hard to see why past practice ought to be a
reason for consistent action in the future within the Executive Branch. And

41. See infra section IV.A.
42. Schoolhouse Rock!, I’m Just a Bill, YOUTUBE (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v⫽tyeJ55o3El0.
43. Admittedly, some think precedent is oversold as a virtue, even when they think abstract
rule-of-law values are important. See, e.g., ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE
SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012); Abner S. Greene, The Fit Dimension, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 2921 (2007).
44. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1339 n.2 (emphasis added).
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electoral transition, or even political winds changing between elections, may
provide reason enough to depart from earlier positions. Indeed, the unitary
executive thesis could be thought to rest on important democratic foundations
that tie executive agency work to a democratically accountable chief executive.45 Being bound to precedent is downright undemocratic under this account.
One could go further, from theory to practice, to make the point. Consider
adjudication at the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), as an example.
One might have thought that an administrative agency like the NLRB, which
has chosen to engage in the vast majority of its policymaking through adversarial litigation,46 might feel constrained by the adjudicative, quasi-judicial
setting to adhere to stare decisis. Yet it is not truly contested that political
shifts—which in turn lead to new appointments at the NLRB—change substantive labor law in the United States, without deep respect for stare decisis.47
Although this practice of adjudication without a commitment to stare decisis is
not, to put it mildly, without its detractors,48 it is some evidence that the
Executive Branch—even when doing mostly adjudicatory work—can feel free
to act without feeling the weight of precedent.49 Thus, one needs an argument
one way or another for whether stare decisis has a role within the workings of
the administrative state.
Yet, Tushnet actually goes on to furnish reasons why the rule-of-law values
that stare decisis embodies and promotes do have a place outside the judiciary.
He explores, for example, the role of “super-statutes” that cannot easily be
repealed or changed because of rule-of-law values that support the application

45. See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENPOWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). For an alternative view emphasizing the dangers of the
concentration of power in a unitary executive, see, for example, Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances
in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994).
46. See generally NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
47. See, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1975) (Board may change its mind
abruptly); NLRB v. Viola Indus., Inc., 979 F.2d 1384, 1391 (10th Cir. 1992) (Board may change its
mind); NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 350 (7th Cir. 1971) (Board policies do not need to abide
by stare decisis because industrial conditions change over time). For discussions of stare decisis at
the NLRB, see generally Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board,
8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707 (2006); Tanja L. Thompson & R. Bradley Mokros, ABA Section of
Labor & Emp’t Law Annual CLE Conference, As the Pendulum Swings: The Role of Precedent in
National Labor Relations Board Decisions (Nov. 4–7, 2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2009/ac2009/159.authcheckdam.pdf. For some examples of issues at the Board that change rapidly with new political appointments, see generally Brown Univ.,
342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004); Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
48. See Facilitating the Use of Rulemaking by the National Labor Relations Board (Recommendation No. 91-5), 1 C.F.R. 305.91-5 (1992).
49. Consider also the well-known practice of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) not to use prior
“letter rulings” about specific taxpayer deduction claims as precedent. But letter rulings—unlike IRS
“revenue rulings,” upon which taxpayers are supposed to rely—are self-consciously binding only on a
specific taxpayer addressee. The letter rulings have little intra-agency review, and the U.S. Tax Court
doesn’t recognize them as precedent in part because of their sheer numerosity. See Davis v. Comm’r,
65 T.C. 1014, 1022–23 (1976); STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 34, at 935–36.
TIAL
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of stare decisis in the legislative arena.50 Indeed, the very legitimacy of governmental institutions can be tied up with their willingness to let past decisions
stand undisturbed, enabling private parties and other governmental entities to
rely on equal treatment in similar fact scenarios.51 Thus, just as stare decisis is a
bedrock practice for the rule of law in courts, it may also serve a similar
bedrock function within the Executive Branch.
Even at the NLRB, “[o]f course, all responsible [Board] Members realize the
value of stare decisis,”52 even if departure from that practice is sometimes
necessary to acclimate to fast-paced changes in politics or the economy.53 It
isn’t that stare decisis is always the paramount value in the Executive Branch;
but it is worth getting clear when it has a place to constrain decisions.54 And
when stare decisis has to give way, the NLRB example reveals one of the most
important substitutes for stare decisis to ensure a legitimate, stable, and reliable
regime: reason-giving. To wit, “so long as the Board explains the reasons for its
departure from past precedent,”55 it gets flexibility.56 This is not to suggest that
the NLRB has struck the right balance among precedent, consistency, and
reason-giving, but it is an example where stare decisis fights for relevance and
is weighed against other values within the administrative state.
The general justifications for stare decisis are easy to state. The reasons
courts hold prior decisions to be binding “without regard to the apparent

50. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1343–46. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn,
Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001).
51. Kathryn Kovacs has argued that the APA serves as a “superstatute” for administrative procedure
within the Executive Branch. See generally Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015).
52. The National Labor Relations Board: Recent Decisions and Their Impact on Workers’ Rights:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, S. Subcomm. on Emp’t & Workplace
Safety, H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, and H. Subcomm. on Health, Emp’t, Labor & Pensions, 110th
Cong. 16 (2007) (statement of Robert J. Battista, Chairman, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.).
53. Notwithstanding courts’ routine passivity in the face of the fast pace of change of substantive
law at the Board, there is severe judicial allergy to retroactive decisions. See, e.g., Epilepsy Found. of
Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC,
826 F.2d 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
54. Cf. Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 114
(2011) (“Like all decisionmakers, agencies operate against the backdrop of their previous rulings. Some
of those rulings may have been issued when the agency was staffed with personnel different, in both
identity and worldview, from those who currently populate it. But even as personnel turn over, the
agency’s prior positions remain relevant.”).
55. Thompson & Mokros, supra note 47, at 3.
56. This is consistent with broader practice across the Executive Branch. Indeed, as the Supreme
Court has made clear, while administrative agencies are not generally required as a formal matter of
administrative law to adhere to precedent, see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502,
514–16 (2009), agencies are under an obligation to provide a reasoned explanation for a change in
position that acknowledges the fact of departure from prior agency pronouncements, id. at 515; see also
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973) (explaining
that agencies have a duty to explain departures from prior decisions); Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. v.
NLRB, 884 F.2d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 1989) (same); NLRB v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 925,
460 F.2d 589, 604 (5th Cir. 1972) (same).
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correctness of the prior decision”57 include: (1) the saving of decision costs;58
(2) the independent value of consistency in governance because it supports
legitimacy;59 (3) providing a “focal point” to help coordinate action by decision
makers and those living under law;60 (4) the need to respect private parties’
reliance on settled law to order their affairs; and (5) the sense that law needs to
be general and generalizable, something that is promoted when officials treat
like cases alike. In short, it is not at all clear that these justifications are limited
to the judicial sphere.
Indeed, one domain within the Executive Branch has recently received some
attention for its internal norms of precedent: the Office of Legal Counsel.61 In
some ways, the case for stare decisis in OLC decisionmaking is straightforward.
The actors in OLC—all lawyers—are self-consciously making legal decisions
and writing legal opinions. These actors are intimately familiar with the jurisprudential firmament and emerge from a culture where people cite cases, statutes,
and constitutional provisions and history to make arguments about legality.
Standing by decisions made is the common law lawyer’s first principle. In fact,
there are many historical instances of Attorneys General essentially treating the
views of their predecessors as having stare decisis effect.62 OLC similarly treats
its previous decisions precedentially.63 More, OLC even writes memos trying to
specify how it intends to respect precedent in future exercises of counsel.64
Although OLC practice and policy confirm that stare decisis has a role
outside the courts proper and within the President’s branch, it would still be
reasonable to ask whether nonlawyers who do not usually reason by case and
precedent do or should feel themselves bound by prior institutional decisions.
Moreover, stare decisis’s contribution to the rule of law does come with important costs of its own, which the NLRB practice highlights. To wit, stare
decisis can create tension with political accountability, creativity, innovation,
dynamism, and flexibility by stuffily hewing to things already decided.
What this all means for the new regleprudence is both that “standing by
things decided” should be on the agenda as a factor in decisionmaking within
the Executive Branch, and that the costs of that mode of decisionmaking must
be weighed in the balance too. As the NLRB example makes clear, however,
rule-of-law values can be vindicated even without stare decisis, so long as
transparent reason-giving is a priority.
It is also worth observing that there are many degrees (and forms) of stare
57. Morrison, supra note 2, at 1449 (adapting Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571,
571 (1987)).
58. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1339.
59. See id. at 1339 n.2. The legitimacy is both sociological and normative.
60. See id. at 1340 (drawing on THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57–58 (1980)).
61. See generally Morrison, supra note 2.
62. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Avi Perry, Administrative Statutory Interpretation in the Antebellum
Republic, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 7, 44.
63. See Morrison, supra note 2, at 1470–74.
64. See id. at 1475.
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decisis, too, so the regleprudential question about precedent is not just a binary
one.65 One can ask not only whether an agency should embrace precedent or
transparency (surely sometimes it should embrace both!), but what mode of
stare decisis is best for the policy space. For example, it is routine to think that
the common law version of stare decisis is departed from more easily in
constitutional interpretation (where judges have the last word), while it is
departed from with greater constraints when courts are interpreting statutes,
given that legislatures can fix interpretive mistakes if any are made within the
judiciary.66 These modes of stare decisis do not exhaust the possibilities for
thinking about how to reason from precedent. But they show that stare decisis
can carry several meanings within the Executive Branch—and that even judicial
actors have multiple approaches to stare decisis.67 Calibrating the right mix of
precedent, reason-giving, and transparency is all on the agenda for regleprudence.
In what follows below, we will explore OIRA’s practices that we think are
rightfully seen as forms of lawmaking. This will prime our inquiry of whether
there is a role for stare decisis in the law made within the Executive Branch—or
whether other kinds of regleprudential commitments to reason-giving or transparency could be a kind of substitute for stare decisis in some modalities of
lawmaking at OIRA.
II. LAW IN THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:
THE EXAMPLE OF OIRA
Just as judicial opinions are the most salient products of courts, and statutes
the embodiment of the work of legislatures, the most visible output of the
administrative state is final agency action, subject to judicial review. This
domain, which includes not only rulemaking, but also enforcement, grant
making, licensing, and similar agency activity, is the traditional purview of
administrative law. Much of what the administrative state does, however, is
never embodied in this type of definitive agency action, or, if it is judicially
reviewable, only incidentally so. Instead, it operates through a significant
institutional substrate, both vertically—through presidential oversight—and horizontally—through interagency relations.68
One of the most important institutions in this infrastructure of the administra65. Cf. Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing varying
models of precedent).
66. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 630–31.
67. The role of precedent is even more complex institutionally within the judiciary, given the
distinction between horizontal and vertical stare decisis, with courts at different levels and across the
federal and state boundary treating prior decisions differently depending on those institutional relationships. There may be some analogy to this within the Executive Branch, given the formal (and informal)
hierarchies within the administrative state.
68. For an excellent discussion of the landscape of contemporary interagency coordination, see Jody
Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131
(2012); see also Bijal Shah, Hidden Administrative Coordination: Interagency Adjudication in Immigra-
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tive state is the Office of Management and Budget, a much-studied but still
poorly understood arm of the White House.69 OMB develops the federal budget,
supervises Executive Branch management rules, and, most controversially,
coordinates regulatory review through its Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs. In this Part we outline OIRA’s history and contemporary functions, then
explain the significant, if largely hidden, array of lawmaking that is involved in
the oversight and coordination that make up regulatory review.
A. OIRA AND ITS DISCONTENTS

1. History and Contemporary Functions
Every modern President has struggled with the simple reality that a relatively
small White House staff must oversee a federal administrative apparatus of
scores of agencies.70 The historical method of interacting through the Cabinet
and other agency heads is hardly equal to this task, and administrations have for
decades sought to rationalize their oversight.71 In 1970, President Nixon established OMB as part of a sweeping effort to assert control over the federal
bureaucracy.72
OMB, as it has evolved through various administrations, now serves as the
primary institutional mechanism through which the President oversees the
Executive Branch. OMB’s responsibilities are divided roughly into three main
functions, although there is much overlap among them.73 The “management”

tion & Beyond, 128 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (exploring interagency coordination in adjudication).
69. Although the most prominent, OMB is only one of a number of similar Executive Branch
institutions. To pick one example, under the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) are each required to convene interagency Small Business Advocacy Review Panels for
proposed rules that will significantly impact a substantial number of small businesses. See Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 244, 110 Stat. 857,
867–68. These panels review proposed rules and hear comments from small business representatives,
then convey that input back to the promulgating agency, where the panel’s report is included in final
rulemaking. See id.
70. If, as Cass Sunstein has noted, White House oversight is undertaken by “a ‘they,’ not an ‘it,’”
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1840, then “they” are quite outnumbered by an Executive Branch that employs nearly three million people. See Total Government Employment Since 1962, U.S. OFFICE PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employmentreports/historical-tables/total-government-employment-since-1962/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (indicating
that in 2011, the number of civilian Executive Branch employees was 2.756 million).
71. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2272 n.96 (2001) (“From
the point of view of administration, the history of the Presidency in the twentieth century has been the
history of presidents’ attempts to gain control of the sprawling federal bureaucracy.” (quoting FORREST
MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 329 (1994))).
72. President Nixon created OMB by reorganizing and expanding what had been the Bureau of the
Budget, an agency originally established in the Treasury Department in 1921, and moved into the White
House structure as part of the creation of the Executive Office of the President in 1939. See id. at
2275–76.
73. As one OMB official pithily noted, “The Government works using three things: money, people,
and regulations; [federal agencies] must get all three through OMB.” Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative
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side of OMB focuses on issues such as human resources, procurement policy,
information technology, financial management, and performance.74 OMB’s
“budget”-side staff, which are centered on five subject-matter-focused resource
management offices, oversee budget submissions by agencies and develop a
unified Administration budget.75
OMB’s third primary function is regulatory review, a process of agency
oversight and interagency coordination that is managed by OIRA.76 Congress
established OIRA as an office within OMB in the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1980 (PRA),77 which was one of a series of regulation-related statutes passed in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Congress initially tasked OIRA only with
overseeing requests by federal agencies to collect information from the general
public under the PRA.78 Shortly after taking office in 1981, however, President
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, which for the first time enabled review
of all rules by OMB.79 The Reagan Administration placed responsibility for this

Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 ADMIN.
L. REV. 37, 65 (2011) (quoting an unnamed OMB official).
74. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and
Budget, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission (last visited Oct. 15,
2014). Much of OMB’s management function is carried out through offices within OMB that, like
OIRA, were established by statute. These other statutory offices are the Office of Federal Financial
Management, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, the Office of Electronic Government and
Information Technology, and the Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator.
See id.
75. See id. Other pockets within the reaches of OMB include the so-called Credit Crew, a group of
staff responsible for overseeing programs that involve federal credit and debt collection, and the
Legislative Reference Division, which reviews and coordinates the steady flow of Executive Branch
legislative proposals, statements of administrative policy, congressional testimony by Administration
officials, and presidential signing statements. See id.
76. Formal regulatory review had its origins with the Nixon Administration’s efforts to curtail
certain regulations by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration that President Nixon considered overly burdensome. One tool that the Nixon Administration used for this was circulating such regulations for comment within the Executive Branch. See Kate
Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1057 (2013); see also Memorandum from George P. Shultz, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of Dep’ts and Agencies,
Agency Regulations, Standards, and Guidelines Pertaining to Environmental Quality, Consumer Protection, and Occupational and Public Health and Safety (Oct. 5, 1971), available at http://www.thecre.com/
ombpapers/QualityofLife1.htm (establishing the Quality of Life Review program for “significant”
proposed and final rules relating to “environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational and
public health and safety”). The Ford and Carter Administrations extended the practice of oversight and
coordination to regulations that were projected to have an annual impact in excess of $100 million.
See William F. West, The Institutionalization of Regulatory Review: Organizational Stability and
Responsive Competence at OIRA, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 76, 79 (2005). For an insider’s history of
regulatory review before OIRA’s establishment, see Tozzi, supra note 73.
77. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended at
44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2012)).
78. The PRA also assigned to OMB responsibility for “information policy, . . . statistical policy and
coordination, records management, privacy, and automatic data processing and telecommunications,” responsibilities that were all delegated to OIRA. Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257, 1259 (2006).
79. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 11, 3
C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 806 (2012). Technically, Executive Order
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process in OIRA’s hands.80 As part of this OIRA review, the Reagan Executive
Order also required all “major rule[s],” defined largely by economic impact, to
be accompanied by a “Regulatory Impact Analysis,” including a comparison of
costs and benefits.81
In 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866, replacing and
greatly expanding Reagan’s regulatory review Executive Order. The Clinton
Executive Order establishes a framework that, with some modifications, still
governs today.82 Executive Order 12,866 requires each agency to provide OIRA
with a list of the agency’s planned regulatory actions, which was intended to set
OIRA’s review agenda.83 The Executive Order then mandates that each agency
provide OIRA with the text of rules at the proposal stage and with an accompanying regulatory assessment, with further OIRA review after notice and comment.84 OIRA also reviews a variety of agency actions that are preliminary to
rulemaking, such as advanced notices of proposed rulemaking, as well as

No. 12,291 merely authorized OMB to review regulatory impact analyses as well as proposed and final
rules, and included a provision that deemed such review completed if OMB did not meet certain
deadlines. See id. § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. at 129.
80. President Reagan further expanded OIRA’s role in regulatory review in 1985, requiring Cabinet
departments and independent agencies to provide OMB with a “regulatory program” each year. See
Copeland, supra note 78, at 1262 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 8, 1985)).
81. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(a), 3 C.F.R. at 128.
82. To give a sense of scale of regulatory review, OIRA conducted a total of 424 reviews in 2012,
the most recent year data are available, including pre-rule, proposed rule, interim rule, final rule, and
notices. See MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43056, COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF
RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER 9 (2013). This was a
significantly lower number than previous years, which had 740 reviews in 2011, 690 reviews in 2010,
and 595 reviews in 2009. Id. Of the 424 reviews OIRA conducted in 2012, 83 were of “economically
significant” regulatory actions. Id. at 11.
83. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(A), 3 C.F.R. at 645. The Executive Order called for
agencies to identify which regulations were significant and provided that:
[T]hose not designated as significant will not be subject to review under this section unless,
within 10 working days of receipt of the list, the Administrator of OIRA notifies the agency
that OIRA has determined that a planned regulation is a significant regulatory action within
the meaning of this Executive order.
Id. The Executive Order further provides that “OIRA may review only actions identified by the agency
or by OIRA as significant regulatory actions under subsection (a)(3)(A) of this section,” id. § 6(b)(1),
3 C.F.R. at 646 (emphasis added), with “[r]egulatory action[s],” again, being only those agency actions
“that promulgate[] or [are] expected to lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation,” id. § 3(e),
3 C.F.R. at 641.
As a practical matter, however, OIRA reviews many agency pronouncements regardless of any
formal designation of significance and, indeed, regardless of whether the pronouncement is even a
“regulatory action” under the technical terms of the Executive Order. Indeed, OMB has indicated
publicly that it reads the Executive Order much more expansively to include even non-binding agency
notices and guidance documents. See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, to Heads and Acting Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, Guidance for Regulatory Review
(Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/
m09-13.pdf. This is, of course, plainly contrary to the text of Executive Order No. 12,866.
84. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. at 645–46.
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agency notices related to grants and similar funding streams.85
OIRA review largely takes place through informal communications with the
agencies involved, but the office is empowered under Executive Order 12,866 to
issue “return letters.”86 These are formal documents designed to apprise an
agency of the grounds for OIRA’s concerns about a given regulatory action.
Although the Executive Order mandates return letters whenever OIRA requires
an agency to give further consideration of some agency action,87 this mechanism for articulating concerns about the substance of regulations under review
has traditionally been used rarely. Its use in the current Administration has
almost entirely ceased, with one return letter issued in the Obama Administration’s first six years.88
The Clinton Executive Order was recently reaffirmed and modified by President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563,89 which has the potential to complicate
the regulatory process and the interpretive tasks facing OIRA in overseeing its
mandates.90 As a statement of overarching Executive Branch regulatory policy,
the Obama Executive Order provides that agencies should:
(1) [P]ropose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that
its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that some benefits and costs are
difficult to quantify);

85. Cf. id. § 6(b)(2)(A), 3 C.F.R. at 646. As noted, the scope of OMB oversight is much broader than
what the Executive Order technically calls for. See supra note 83.
OIRA is supposed to review preliminary agency actions prior to rulemaking within ten days, and then
review regulatory actions at each stage within ninety days, although the office is technically allowed a
thirty-day extension. OIRA review, however, has slowed in recent years, and currently regularly fails to
meet the Executive Order’s deadlines. See generally CURTIS W. COPELAND, LENGTH OF RULE REVIEWS BY
THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS (2013). Copeland notes that in the first half of 2013,
the average period of time OIRA took to review regulatory actions was 140 days, with a number of
rules languishing significantly longer. Id. at 24–25; see also Editorial, Stuck in Purgatory, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/opinion/stuck-in-purgatory.html?_r⫽0 (decrying
the length of OIRA review).
86. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 647. The Executive Order also provides for
similar communication notifying agencies in writing at the end of the review period. Id. § 6(b)(2),
3 C.F.R. at 646. As discussed below, in addition to these return and review letters, OIRA also issues
“prompt” letters on OIRA’s initiative to suggest regulatory action by an agency. See infra section II.C.
87. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 647 (“For each regulatory action that the
Administrator of OIRA returns to an agency for further consideration of some or all of its provisions,
the Administrator of OIRA shall provide the issuing agency a written explanation for such return,
setting forth the pertinent provision of this Executive order on which OIRA is relying.”).
88. See Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa P.
Jackson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/ozone_national_ambient_air_quality_standards_letter.pdf. For the practice in prior administrations,
see OIRA Return Letters, OFFICE INFO. & REG. AFF., http:// www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoReturnLetters
(last visited Oct. 15, 2014); see also Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1846 n.37 (noting that the use of return
letters is “highly unusual in any administration”).
89. Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816
(2012).
90. Cass Sunstein has described Executive Order 13,563 as “a kind of mini-constitution for the
regulatory state.” Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1846.

2015]

REGLEPRUDENCE—AT OIRA AND BEYOND

279

(2) [T]ailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society, consistent
with obtaining regulatory objectives, taking into account, among other
things, and to the extent practicable, the costs of cumulative regulations;
(3) [S]elect, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, those
approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity);
(4) [T]o the extent feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than
specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities
must adopt; and
(5) [I]dentify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including
providing economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as
user fees or marketable permits, or providing information upon which
choices can be made by the public.91

OIRA primarily undertakes case-by-case regulatory review, but also occasionally is part of an OMB process of promulgating general, forward-looking
guidance to agencies on regulatory issues.92 For example, in 2003, OMB issued
Circular A-4, providing general direction to all executive agencies “to assist
analysts . . . by defining good regulatory analysis” and “standardizing the way
benefits and costs of Federal regulatory actions are measured and reported.”93
The Circular sets forth what OMB (and presumably OIRA) considers the core
elements of regulatory analysis, providing detailed guidance for each of the
elements.94
In short, Executive Orders 12,866 and 13,563 together create an oversight
structure as well as articulate a regulatory philosophy through which OIRA
seeks to manage the administrative state.

91. Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. at 215. One longtime career OIRA staffer has noted that
ensuring compliance with the predecessor statement of regulatory philosophy in Executive Order
12,866 is as much a part of OIRA oversight as ensuring compliance with the Executive Order’s
analytical requirements. See Donald R. Arbuckle, OIRA and Presidential Regulatory Review: A View
from Inside the Administrative State 39 (May 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
92. OIRA also occasionally, although rarely, enters into memoranda of understanding with specific
agencies. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs
and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (May 9, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/oira_cftc_mou_2012.pdf (governing sharing of technical assistance); Memorandum of Understanding Between the Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin. and
the Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov//sites/
default/files/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/oira1.pdf.
93. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS
1 (2003) [hereinafter CIRCULAR A-4]; see also OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER 1 (2011).
94. See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 93, at 2 (calling for each regulatory impact analysis to include
“(1) a statement of the need for the proposed action, (2) an examination of alternative approaches, and
(3) an evaluation of the benefits and costs—quantitative and qualitative—of the proposed action and the
main alternatives identified by the analysis”).
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2. Critiques of OIRA
OIRA—and the larger OMB oversight structure in which the office operates—
has come under sustained criticism almost since the inception of regulatory
review. The full panoply of these critiques does not bear extensive rehearsing,
but to understand OIRA’s legal functions, it is useful to outline three of the most
prominent.
The first is that OIRA undertakes regulatory review with an antiregulatory
bias. This is hardly surprising, given the roots of regulatory review in the Nixon
Administration’s hostility to environmental, occupational safety, and consumer
regulation.95 But the charge continues to have significant salience across administrations. OIRA is frequently seen as an institution inclined to slow, water
down, or block regulation, ostensibly under the banner of cost–benefit analysis.96 This concern is bolstered by the relative expertise that agencies tend to
have in their areas of particular focus, compared to an oversight institution that
is tasked with trying to rationalize almost the entire range of Executive Branch
subject matters.97
Closely related to this critique is a second concern, that the seemingly neutral
process through which OIRA oversees regulation involves an inappropriate
degree of political interference from the White House.98 This argument privileges the idea of regulation as the realm of expertise, with rulemaking understood as a process of informed, technical decisionmaking, as opposed to the
expression of any administration’s political preferences. This has generated a
significant debate over the relative political insulation of OIRA versus the
agencies that is difficult to resolve empirically.99 Regardless of whether OIRA
or the agencies are more subject to capture, however, OIRA has always been
viewed with some suspicion for acting as a conduit for naked political preferences in the regulatory arena.
Finally, especially under recent OIRA administrators, the office has come
under attack for its lack of transparency and consistency. As Lisa Heinzerling

95. See supra note 76.
96. OIRA’s defenders take the opposite view, arguing that OIRA review actually improves, rather
than undermines, the regulatory work of the agencies. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 5. A related
argument in favor of OIRA review is that the office’s function is less to improve the quality of
regulation or coordinate potential conflicts among agencies, but to police fidelity to the President’s
policy agenda. See Livermore, supra note 5, at 616.
97. Again, the obverse of this concern is that OIRA’s panoptical perspective may add value in
reviewing and modifying any individual regulation. Cf. Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1084–85 (1986) (defending
OMB substantive regulatory input). Moreover, much of OIRA review actually involves interagency
coordination, which allows the office to draw on the expertise of cognate agencies particularly focused
on the subject matter of any given regulation.
98. See Alan B. Morrison, Commentary, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong
Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1070–71 (1986); Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the
Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL. L. 1083, 1104–05 (2007).
99. See, e.g., Livermore & Revesz, supra note 5; see also Livermore, supra note 5 (arguing that
cost–benefit analysis actually serves to preserve agency independence).
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has noted, Executive Order 12,866 imposes a number of requirements on OIRA
designed to mandate disclosure of critical aspects of its decisionmaking, yet
OIRA regularly and blithely ignores these mandates.100 OIRA is often seen as a
black box, not only to the general public, but more immediately to the agencies
whose day-to-day work requires OIRA approval.101 There are few mechanisms
that enable OIRA to provide public reasons for its regulatory decisions,102
which ultimately undermines OIRA’s legitimacy.
All of these concerns have direct bearing on why rule-of-law values matter in
the internal workings of the administrative state.
B. LEGAL INTERPRETATION IN REGULATORY REVIEW

Scholars have largely focused on OIRA’s coordination and policy oversight,
but much of what OIRA does as a functional matter implicates questions of law
on a range of substantive and procedural issues.103 Although Congress has
formally delegated to OIRA only responsibility for the PRA,104 a statutory role
that requires some measure of interpretive discretion, a much broader swath of
OIRA’s work involves legal interpretation. Indeed, Executive Order 12,866
specifically delegates to OIRA the job of ensuring that “each agency’s regulatory actions are consistent with applicable law.”105 This places legal interpretation at the core of regulatory review, although largely outside of judicial
review.106
As this section describes, the legal questions that OIRA staff—the overwhelming majority of whom are not lawyers—are regularly called upon to grapple
with can be roughly grouped into three categories: questions of OIRA jurisdiction and authority; trans-substantive doctrines of administrative practice; and
substantive questions of law.
1. Interpretations of OIRA Jurisdiction and Authority
As noted, Executive Orders 12,866 and 13,563 establish the parameters of
OIRA oversight and raise a number of textual questions that determine whether,
to what extent, and with what kind of scrutiny a given agency action will be

100. See Heinzerling, Inside EPA, supra note 6, at 330–33.
101. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-205, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF RULES DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS TO THE TRANSPARENCY
OF OMB REGULATORY REVIEWS (2009).
102. For a discussion of these limited mechanisms, see infra section II.C.
103. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1842 n.18 (“OIRA helps to ensure that . . . legal issues receive
careful attention and that those within the executive branch believe that regulatory actions are
consistent with law. Indeed, this responsibility is central.”).
104. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
105. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 646 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
805 (2012).
106. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 5, at 1339 (“The OIRA oversight process is entirely
internal to the executive branch: it was established by executive order . . . and is not subject to judicial
review.”).
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reviewed. For example, the question of whether an action is subject to review at
all turns on the definition of “regulation” or “rule” in Executive Order 12,866,
as well as the meaning of the term “regulatory action.” The Executive Order
echoes the definition in the APA of “rule” (and, in turn, “rulemaking”), although there are some differences.107 The Executive Order’s definition of
“rule,” like the APA’s, has several exceptions, including “rules that pertain to a
military or foreign affairs function of the United States,”108 and rules “that are
limited to agency organization, management, or personnel matters.”109 The
Executive Order’s definition of “regulatory action,” moreover, covers “any substantive action . . . that promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation
of a final rule or regulation,”110 a sweeping scope that is, again, open to
interpretation.
Beyond the threshold jurisdictional question of regulatory action vel non,
Executive Order 12,866 nominally divides OIRA oversight into two categories.111 A first, general subset of regulatory actions is defined as “significant,” a
determination of which can be triggered by four criteria:
“Significant regulatory action” means any regulatory action that is likely to
result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or tribal governments or communities;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action
taken or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,
or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the
President’s priorities, or the principles set forth in this Executive order.112

107. The APA generally defines a “rule” to be “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general
or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy
or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency,” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(2012), while Executive Order 12,866 defines a “rule” or “[r]egulation” to be “an agency statement of
general applicability and future effect, which the agency intends to have the force and effect of law, that
is designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe the procedure or practice
requirements of an agency,” Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(d), 3 C.F.R. at 641.
108. Id. § 3(d)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 641.
109. Id. § 3(d)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 641.
110. Id. § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. at 641.
111. Under the Congressional Review Act, moreover, Congress may disapprove “major” regulations through a theoretically expedited legislative process, 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3) (2012), and the statute
delegates the task of delineating “major” rules to OIRA based on a definition that parallels President
Reagan’s Executive Order’s definition, compare id. § 804(2), with Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 1(b),
3 C.F.R. 127, 127–28 (1982), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 11, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 806 (2012). See generally Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional
Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162 (2009).
112. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. at 641–42.
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If a rule is deemed “significant” under any of these standards, the determination triggers OIRA review and the requirement for regulatory impact analysis.
Within that general category, if a rule is determined to be economically significant under the first part of the analysis, the required scope of cost–benefit
analysis is more extensive.113
These are all important definitional issues because whether an agency action
constitutes “[r]egulatory action” and, more importantly, whether that regulatory
action is “significant” or “economically significant” determines OIRA jurisdiction,114 and agencies can have legitimate reasons for checking OIRA overreach.
Not surprisingly, OIRA and the agencies it oversees do, in fact, disagree about
the interpretation of these terms.115
2. Trans-Substantive Administrative Process
The APA and individual statutory regimes govern many aspects of agency
process.116 But OIRA polices a variety of administrative processes not addressed by the APA or other statutes, forming a body of law that is comprised of
a combination of quasi-statutory law based in executive orders and a type of
administrative common law.
a. Cost–Benefit Analysis. Since OIRA’s founding, one central focus of regulatory review has been the requirement that agencies prepare, and OIRA review,
regulatory impact analyses.117 Executive Order 12,866 and OMB’s Circular A-4
specify requirements for this exercise.118 Under the Executive Order, all signifi-

113. Roughly one-sixth to one-seventh of the regulatory actions OIRA reviews fall into this category
of extra scrutiny for economic significance. See Copeland, supra note 78, at 1257.
114. Or, at least these definitions should carry such significance, if OIRA is following the Executive
Order with fidelity. For a discussion of ways in which OIRA departs from the plain language of the
Executive Order in practice, see infra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
115. As some evidence of this tussle, one can look to the FAQs that OMB has issued to clarify the
scope of the Executive Order. Under the question of economic significance, OMB has clarified:
The $100 million threshold applies to the impact of the proposed or final regulation in
any one year, and it includes benefits, costs, or transfers. (The word “or” is important:
$100 million in annual benefits, or costs, or transfers is sufficient; $50 million in benefits and
$49 million in costs, for example, is not.).
OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) 1 (2011) [hereinafter FAQS]. The alternative trigger for economic
significance—that a regulation would “adversely affect in a material way” the economy or sectors of
the economy—is even harder to pin down and open to interpretation. OIRA has noted that “[t]here are
no hard-and-fast rules here,” id., but has not offered much general guidance beyond that.
116. The APA sets forth procedures for the most common form of rulemaking, called “informal” in
the nomenclature of the statute for its notice-and-comment requirements, as well as formal rulemaking
and various forms of hybrid and negotiated approaches to rulemaking. See generally M. Elizabeth
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004).
117. See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128–30, revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866
§ 11, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 806 (2012) (Regulatory Impact
Analysis and Review).
118. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 645–46; CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 93.
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cant rules must include an “assessment of the potential costs and benefits of the
regulatory action,”119 while, as noted, the analysis for economically significant
regulations must be elaborated in much greater depth.120
Although regulatory impact analysis is a practice dominated by economists
and public policy generalists, both at OIRA and the agencies, the terms and
nuances of cost–benefit analysis present a legal interpretive exercise. What
counts as a “cost”? How are regulatory “benefits” determined? Over what
period of time and with how much uncertainty should any of these factors be
measured?121 Moreover, under the Executive Orders and related guidance
documents, cost–benefit analysis involves sometimes quite difficult trade-offs
between quantifiable and nonquantifiable values. As Executive Order 13,563
notes, “each agency may consider (and discuss qualitatively) values that are
difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and
distributive impacts.”122 All of these issues not only raise deeply contestable
normative questions,123 but are also exactly the kinds of interpretive determinations that legal actors are typically called upon to make in other contexts.124
b. Structural Oversight. OIRA oversight also includes the management of the
mechanics of regulation at the agencies. Agencies are required, for example, to
develop a unified agenda of all pending regulations and a “Regulatory Plan”
that should specify “the most important significant regulatory actions.”125 The
idea of this, and related authority under the two primary regulatory review
Executive Orders, is to create a planning mechanism that, if operating according

119. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B)(ii), 3 C.F.R. at 645.
120. Specifically, for this subset of regulations, agencies must provide greater detail on, and
quantification of, “benefits anticipated from the regulatory action (such as, but not limited to, the
promotion of the efficient functioning of the economy and private markets, the enhancement of health
and safety, the protection of the natural environment, and the elimination or reduction of discrimination or bias),” id. § 6(a)(3)(C)(i), 3 C.F.R. at 645, as well as a similar analysis of anticipated costs such
as, “but not limited to, the direct cost both to the government in administering the regulation and to
businesses and others in complying with the regulation, and any adverse effects on the efficient
functioning of the economy, private markets (including productivity, employment, and competitiveness), health, safety, and the natural environment[].” Id. § 6(a)(3)(C)(ii), 3 C.F.R. at 646. Finally, the
Executive Order requires an assessment of “potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives”
and “an explanation why the planned regulatory action is preferable to the identified potential
alternatives.” Id. § 6(a)(3)(C)(iii), 3 C.F.R. at 646.
121. OMB Circular A-4 and related documents, see, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AGENCY CHECKLIST: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (2010); FAQS, supra
note 115, elaborate in some detail on these questions.
122. Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
817 (2012).
123. There is significant literature on the normative valence of cost–benefit analysis. See, e.g., FRANK
ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF
NOTHING (2004).
124. Cost–benefit analysis, as such, is not subject to direct judicial review, but to the extent that the
quality of an agency’s Regulatory Impact Analysis is a factor in APA review, then unlike much of what
OIRA does, its handiwork in this context has an external check.
125. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 642.
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to their description, places OIRA at the center of a coordination process that
includes elevating conflicts between agencies to the vice-presidential level.126
OIRA likewise manages government-wide deregulatory exercises that implicate questions of law. Executive Order 13,563, for example, instructs federal
agencies to develop a plan for reviewing—and possibly modifying or repealing—
existing rules, both immediately after the Executive Order’s effective date and
on an ongoing basis.127 Specifically, the Executive Order mandates that “agencies shall consider how best to promote retrospective analysis of rules that may
be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify,
streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has been learned.”128
This process, overseen by OIRA, requires legal interpretation of statutory
commands, not only the calculation of the costs and benefits of rules.129
There are a number of structural or process-oriented statutes, moreover, that
are regularly implicated in OIRA review, regardless of the substantive domain
of any given regulatory exercise. These include the National Environmental
Policy Act,130 the Regulatory Flexibility Act,131 the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,132 and others.133 Again, all of these structural statutes present legal

126. Originally, the Clinton Executive Order placed this conflict-resolution responsibility with the
Vice President. See id. § 4(c)(5), 3 C.F.R. at 643. In 2002, President Bush issued Executive Order
13,258, removing this responsibility from the Vice President, but in 2009, President Obama revoked
the Bush-era Executive Order, restoring Executive Order 12,866 to its prior form. See Exec. Order
No. 13,497 §§ 1–2, 3 C.F.R. 218, 218 (2010), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816 (2012) (revoking
Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008) and Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003)).
127. Executive Order 13,563, although relatively recent, has the potential to add to both the
complexity of agency regulatory process and, more immediately for our purposes, to the interpretive
tasks facing OIRA in overseeing its mandates.
128. Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 215, 217 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
817 (2012).
129. For an earlier version of this deregulatory mandate, see Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 5, 3 C.F.R.
at 644. The Obama Administration followed up Executive Order 13,563 with Executive Order 13,579,
which urged independent agencies to conduct the same kind of retrospective review of regulations. See
Exec. Order No. 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 817–18 (2012).
130. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012).
131. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2012). Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
agencies must conduct “regulatory flexibility” analyses for proposed and final rules that will have
“significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” Id. § 602(a).
132. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act requires agencies to assess the
costs and benefits of federal mandates that could require expenditures by state, local, and tribal
governments or by the private sector of more than $100 million in any one year. See id.
133. Similarly, several crosscutting executive orders can be implicated in regulatory review. For
example, Executive Order 13,132, on “Federalism,” see Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 807–09 (2012), contains procedural and substantive requirements
for agency regulation that raise questions of interpretation. It mandates that agencies “have an
accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input by State and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism implications.” Id. § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. at 209. It also
requires agencies to interpret statutes that have “federalism implications” to narrow the scope of
potential preemption when issuing rules, see id. § 4(a), 3 C.F.R. at 208, as well as to grant states as
much “administrative discretion” as allowed under the terms of any cooperative federalism regime, id.
§ 3(c), 3 C.F.R. at 208. Similar crosscutting executive orders potentially at issue in rulemaking cover
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questions implicated in the process of OIRA oversight; when OIRA takes a
stand on an answer, it is in the process of making law.
c. Procedural Administrative Common Law. Although the APA sets the framework for specific administrative procedures,134 OIRA has undertaken, through a
kind of administrative common law, to push agencies to undertake various
forms of notice and comment or other public input for actions that would not
otherwise formally require such procedures.135 For example, OIRA regularly
encourages agencies to seek comment on informal agency actions that come shy
of regulation, as well as when agencies are drafting regulatory impact analyses.136 Similarly, when the Obama Administration promulgated Executive Order
13,563, then-OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein outlined public-outreach procedures that he recommended accompany each agency’s look-back review of
existing rules.137
3. Substantive Legal Interpretation
Perhaps the most controversial (and least studied) aspect of OIRA’s legal
work involves the office’s interpretation of substantive statutes delegated to
specific agencies in the course of regulatory review. When President Reagan
first directed OIRA to engage in regulatory review under Executive Order
12,291, there was sufficient concern in the White House about the legality of
this involvement in substantive regulation that OLC was called upon to opine.
In concluding that OIRA review did not unconstitutionally infringe on the
authority that Congress had delegated to agencies, OLC emphasized that:

issues such as takings, see Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1989), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 800–01 (2012); environmental concerns, see Exec. Order No. 13,045, 3 C.F.R. 198 (1998), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app. at 280–82 (2012); and energy impacts, see Exec. Order No. 13,211, 3
C.F.R. 767 (2002), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 13201 app. at 1306–07 (2012), among others.
134. For an argument that courts regularly engraft procedural requirements in contravention of the
simplicity contemplated by the APA, see Kovacs, supra note 51.
135. Moreover, OIRA sets—and monitors closely—the form and format of proposed and final rules,
requiring, for example, statements that proffer “a reasonably detailed description of the need for the
regulatory action,” Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B)(i), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1994), reprinted in
5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 805 (2012), and Circular A-4 has elaborated on the possible justifications at
length, see CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 93, at 3–7 (detailing the range of possible market failures and
other justifications that might prompt regulation, including “improving the functioning of government,
removing distributional unfairness, or promoting privacy and personal freedom”).
136. See, e.g., CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 93, at 3 (“As you design, execute, and write your regulatory
analysis, you should seek out the opinions of those who will be affected by the regulation as well as the
views of those individuals and organizations who may not be affected but have special knowledge or
insight into the regulatory issues.”).
137. See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, and of Indep. Regulatory Agencies, Executive Order 13563,
“Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review” 5–6 (Feb. 2, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-10.pdf. We will discuss the lawmaking function of
OIRA-issued memoranda below. See infra section III.A.
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The [Executive] [O]rder does not empower the Director [of OIRA] . . . to
displace the relevant agencies in discharging their statutory functions or in
assessing and weighing the costs and benefits of proposed actions. . . . [The
Director’s] power of consultation would not . . . include authority to reject an
agency’s ultimate judgment, delegated to it by law, that potential benefits
outweigh costs, that priorities under the statute compel a particular course of
action, or that adequate information is available to justify regulation.138

Although this analysis predated the Supreme Court’s Chevron decision, it is
consistent with one foundational principle the Court identified in that case as
undergirding deference, which is that Congress selects specific agencies to be
“entrusted to administer” particular statutory regimes.139 The principle is also
reflected in Executive Order 12,866, which explicitly disclaims the displacement of agency legal authority.140
However, notwithstanding OLC and the Executive Order’s reservation of
ultimate decisionmaking in the agencies, and Chevron’s structural implications,
it is inevitable that not only in terms of cost–benefit analysis, but also in
evaluating the substantive merits of individual regulations, OIRA must engage
with the substantive statutory provisions on which any given regulation is
based.
To give one example, Lisa Heinzerling has written about modifications made
by OIRA to a rule promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
interpreting the Clean Air Act.141 The rule covered water-intake structures used
to cool power plants, and was being issued under Section 316(b) of the Act.
That provision requires, in relevant part, that any standards governing such
structures “reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact.”142 EPA, however, withdrew its proposal to use what was,
Heinzerling argues, the best available technology for certain particularly harmful power plants because of a cost–benefit interpretation of the statute by OIRA
that took a significantly different view of the meaning of the operative clause
than EPA had.143
OIRA involvement in the interpretation of primary substantive legislation can
be innocuous or not, depending on the nature of OIRA’s intervention, and there
is a longstanding debate about comparative institutional competence as between
138. Memorandum from Larry L. Simms, supra note 10, at 63–64.
139. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). On
Chevron’s structural implications for presidential oversight, compare Kagan, supra note 71 (arguing in
favor of presidential authority to direct administrative action under statutory delegations to agencies),
with Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
263 (2006) (arguing that congressional delegation to an agency does not imply delegation to the
President).
140. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 9, 3 C.F.R. at 649 (“Nothing in this order shall be construed as
displacing the agencies’ authority or responsibilities, as authorized by law.”).
141. See generally Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 6.
142. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012).
143. See Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 6, at 1104–06.
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OIRA and the agencies that we need not rehearse here.144 Our observation is
simply that weighing in on substantive statutory questions in the course of
regulatory review is part and parcel of the day-to-day work of the office. Indeed,
OIRA’s internal institutional organization reflects this fact in so far as the
“desks” within the office are divided along subject-matter lines, with desk
officers on the front line focused only on individual clusters of statutes and
subject areas.145 Although regulatory review is trans-substantive at a conceptual
level, OIRA’s interactions with the agencies it oversees at a practical level is
statute and subject specific,146 inevitably involving OIRA in a wide range of
statutory questions.
C. TRACES OF OIRA COMMON LAW

Having laid the foundation for understanding OIRA’s lawmaking function
at the conceptual level, it is possible to find clear and telling traces of this
aspect of the office’s functioning in the letters it publishes and makes public,
which together give some indication of a type of common law produced by the
office.147 Since 2001, OIRA has kept a repository of letters online, ostensibly to
enable the public to better understand its work and to comply with its organizational executive orders.148 The repository includes three types of letters: prompt
letters, which are written to encourage agencies to undertake an action or repeal
an existing regulatory requirement; return letters, which communicate when
OIRA believes a rule must be withdrawn or delayed; and review letters, which
are written when OIRA does not delay or reject a rule but still wants an agency
to engage in further consideration or deliberation about issues pertinent to a
rulemaking.149
144. See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 97, at 1084–85 (defending OMB substantive
regulatory input).
145. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1845 (“OIRA consists of about forty-five people, almost all of
them career staff. They work in a number of ‘branches,’ covering different agencies and areas. Each of
the branches has a number of ‘desk officers,’ all with substantive expertise in one or more areas, and
spending most of their time on one or a small number of agencies. For example, a desk officer may
specialize in regulatory actions from the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of
Transportation, or the Environmental Protection Agency.”).
146. See id. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOA-03-929, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE
IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS (2003).
147. For another effort to describe “the common law of 13,563,” see Heinzerling, Inside EPA, supra
note 6, at 342–64.
148. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 34–35 (4th ed. 2006); Brian
Mannix, A Mid-Term Grade for the Bush Administration, REG., Fall 2003, at 12, 14–15; Rebecca
Adams, Regulating the Rule-Makers: John Graham at OIRA, CQ WKLY. (Feb. 23, 2002), http://
0-library.cqpress.com.gull.georgetown.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport107-000000384218.
Some agencies, moreover, also make publicly available redline/strikeout versions of rules that reflect
changes made in response to OIRA comments. These can be accessed on the regulations.gov website,
although they are not catalogued individually or referenced in any kind of systematic way. These
redlines provide another window into the “common law” of OIRA oversight, but they are difficult to
decode, given that the redlines include no explanation or substantive discussion.
149. All three categories of letters in the repository can be accessed at the following link: http://
www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/letters.jsp. As noted above, see supra section II.A, the repository
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Here, we peer into OIRA’s nearly three-and-a-half decade experience overseeing regulatory review, with an emphasis on the second Bush Administration,
when the office appeared to take somewhat more seriously the mandate in
Executive Order 12,866 to provide written statements on return and review.150
Given the breadth of OIRA’s work, the repository is a small sample, to be
sure.151 However, despite that much of what OIRA does—including its lawmaking work—is “informal” and does not leave a public paper trial, there is still
good reason to pursue the more “formal” actions it takes that are publicly
memorialized in the repository of opinion and decision letters.152
A careful reading of the entire repository, despite the limitations of this
empirical record, yields several insights into OIRA’s legal function.153 As a
reflects those provisions of Executive Order 12,866 that require OIRA to provide statements in writing
to agencies when completing a regulatory review or returning a proposed regulatory action to an agency
for further review. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(2)–(3), 3 C.F.R. 638, 646–47 (1994), reprinted in
5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 805 (2012).
150. There are no letters in the repository prior to 2001 and two since 2009: a 2010 review letter
regarding a rule from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) on tire fuel
efficiency consumer information and, as noted above, a 2011 letter to the EPA on ambient air quality
standards. As a result, the overwhelming bulk of the evidence in the repository comes from the two
terms of the second Bush Administration.
151. The entire repository contains only twenty-eight return letters, sixteen review letters, and
sixteen prompt letters, representing a tiny fraction of the regulatory review underway during the
relevant period. For a thorough look at the data on OIRA’s review work, see Acs & Cameron, supra
note 5.
152. Although this repository constitutes the best publicly available evidence of an articulated
rationale behind OIRA’s work product, the lack of detail in the letters is striking. The rules that OIRA
was reviewing were often lengthy and no doubt in many cases required months, if not years, of staff
work at the agencies seeking to promulgate them. This suggests that the real substance of OIRA’s
review even in an era during which return and review letters were more common was conveyed through
the kinds of informal and in-person communications that dominate the OIRA–agency relationship. The
record can only provide surface traces of much more complex underlying dynamics.
153. The repository also sheds some light on common misperceptions about OIRA. For example,
although OIRA is sometimes thought to have special target agencies for its work, the repository shows
letters addressed to a diverse set of agencies: the Food and Drug Administration, EPA, Department of
the Interior, NHTSA, National Institutes of Health, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight,
Marine Administration, OSHA, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Homeland
Security, Department of Energy, NASA, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department
of Defense, General Services Administration, Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA), Small Business
Administration, Social Security Administration (SSA), Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Aviation Administration, and NOAA.
Moreover, as some evidence that not all of OIRA’s actions are deregulatory despite the office’s
reputation, several prompt letters (all of which, as noted, were promulgated during the second Bush
Administration) could be classified as supportive and inviting of more regulation rather than less
regulation. See, e.g., Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, and
James L. Connaughton, Chairman, Council on Envtl. Quality, to Benjamin Grumbles, Acting Assistant
Adm’r, Office of Water, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Apr. 16, 2004), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
prompt/epa_beach-act-2000.pdf (encouraging federal regulation to create safe beaches rather than
waiting for state-based standard setting); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. &
Regulatory Affairs, to Craig Manson, Assistant Sec’y for Fish & Wildlife & Parks, Dep’t of the Interior
(Aug. 21, 2003), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/doi_mapping_prompt.pdf (encouraging an initiative to provide more information to the public); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r,
Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Claude A. Allen, Deputy Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human
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threshold matter, many of the letters confirm that OIRA focuses its review on
cost–benefit analysis and often asks agencies for more careful or different
regulatory impact analysis, occasionally challenging the methodology employed
by the expert agency.154 Moreover, recent efforts by scholars to study OIRA’s
activities have emphasized the degree to which the office focuses on interagency coordination in the Executive Branch.155 There is substantial evidence
in the repository that this is indeed a focus of OIRA’s work.156 And scholarly

Servs., and James R. Moseley, Deputy Sec’y, Dep’t of Agric. (May 27, 2003), available at http://www.
reginfo.gov/public/prompt/prompt_dietary_052703.pdf (encouraging the USDA and HHS to update
dietary guidelines and the food pyramid); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. &
Regulatory Affairs, to Armando Falcon, Jr., Dir., Office of Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight (May 29, 2002),
available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ prompt/prompt_ofheo052902.html (encouraging more rules
to control the corporate governance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as new disclosure
obligations); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Tommy G.
Thompson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.
gov/public/prompt/hhs_prompt_letter.html (encouraging the FDA to pay more careful attention to the
regulation of trans fatty acids); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory
Affairs, to John Henshaw, Assistant Sec’y of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. (Sept. 18,
2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ prompt/osha_prompt_letter.html (encouraging OSHA
to require automatic external defibrillators in the workplace).
154. See, e.g., Letter from Susan E. Dudley, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Marcus C. Peacock, Deputy Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (July 3, 2008), available at http://www.reg
info.gov/public/return/Epa_Return_letter_7_03.pdf (returning rule to justify costs of pesticide container
recycling regulation); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Kay
Cole James, Dir., Office of Pers. Mgmt. (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
return/opm_return_letter.pdf (returning rule on federal employee health benefits because of cost–benefit
analysis inadequacies); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Kirk K. Van Tine, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Transp. (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/return/dot_revised_tire_rtnltr.pdf (returning rule on tire pressure for cost–benefit analysis inadequacies); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Bill Hawks,
Dep’t of Agric. (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ return/usda_ee_for_
nonhuman_primates_rtnltr012902.html (returning rule for agency’s failure to address “likely significant
economic impacts”); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Jeffrey R. Holmstead, Assistant Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept. 24, 2001), available at http://
www.reginfo.gov/public/postreview/spark_engines_epa_sep2001.html (disagreeing with the way the
EPA decided how to measure costs, citing earlier OMB guidelines that should control); Letter from
John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Rosalind A. Knapp, Deputy Gen.
Counsel, Dep’t of Transp. (Sept. 14, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/
boeing737_return_letter.html (returning rule for cost-effectiveness analysis); Letter from John D.
Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Rosalind A. Knapp, Acting Gen. Counsel,
Dep’t of Transp. (Aug. 8, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/wetlines_return_
letter3.html (returning rule for agency’s failure to justify the costs of a regulation).
155. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1840, 1850. See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 68.
156. See, e.g., Letter from Donald R. Arbuckle, Deputy Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs,
to Rosalind A. Knapp, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Transp. (July 20, 2001), available at http://
www.reginfo.gov/public/return/faa_repair_stations_rtnltr-dot.html (returning rule to encourage interagency coordination); Letter from Susan E. Dudley, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (July 10, 2008), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/postreview/OIRA_letter_to_EPA_7_10_08.pdf (encouraging interagency coordination on greenhouse gas emission regulation); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory
Affairs, to Rosalind A. Knapp, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Transp. (June 13, 2003), available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/return-dot061303.pdf (returning rule for failure to coordinate on
ocean vessel regulation); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
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work on OIRA’s role in promoting public participation in notice-and-comment
processes and elsewhere157 is also reinforced by the repository.158
Yet what is most relevant for regleprudence are the many and varied traces of
engagement with legal questions across the repository. In terms of transsubstantive administrative process, several prompt letters acknowledge that the
kind of analysis OIRA wants to see from regulatory agencies is not necessarily
required by the organic statutes that agencies administer.159 This record highlights the way the Executive Orders that structure OIRA’s work are sources of
law that affect the application of statutory law. In some cases, OIRA presses
against statutory commands and even considers legislative fixes for rules it
disfavors.160
Indeed, a substantial number of letters take explicit positions on statutory
interpretation, using the leverage the office has during regulatory review to
enforce particular (and potentially contestable) interpretations that may have
been congressionally delegated to the agency being reviewed rather than to
OIRA.161 Sometimes OIRA is seeking to enforce statutory commands under

Bill Hawks, Under Sec’y for Mktg., Dep’t of Agric. (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/return/usda_ee_for_ nonhuman_primates_rtnltr012902.html (encouraging interagency coordination); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Tim McClain, Gen.
Counsel, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs (Sept. 28, 2001), available at http://www. reginfo.gov/public/return/
va_exclusions_rtnltr.html (enforcing VA–DOJ interagency coordination in VA rulemaking).
157. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1846, 1870.
158. See, e.g., Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Rosalind A. Knapp, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Transp. (Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://
www.reginfo.gov/public/return/return-dot_rspa.pdf (returning rule for public comment); Letter from
John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Tracy Mehan, Assistant Adm’r for
Water, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/
epa_water_quality_rtnltr.html (returning rule for more input from the states); Letter from John D.
Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Mary Glenn-Croft, Special Advisor to the
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin. (Sept. 27, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/
ssa_4rules_rtnltr.html (returning rule to enable the SSA to seek comments).
159. See, e.g., Letter from Donald R. Arbuckle, Acting Adm’r & Deputy Adm’r, Office of Info. &
Regulatory Affairs, to Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Apr. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/Prompt_Letter_to_EPA.pdf.
160. See Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to William T.
Hawks, Under Sec’y for Mktg. & Regulatory Programs, Dep’t of Agric. (Oct. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/postreview/ltr_to_william_hawks_on_cool.pdf (recognizing that the relevant “statute severely restricts USDA’s discretion in crafting this rule,” but still pressing the agency to
focus more on costs to consumers than the statute requires and considering “legislative relief”); Letter
from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Kirk K. Van Tine, Gen. Counsel,
Dep’t of Transp. (Oct. 22, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/postreview/faa_tcas_rtn1022-01.html (recognizing that the “FAA has limited alternatives available under the statute,” but still
urging it to focus more on costs and consider whether implementing the statute is reasonable); see also
Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Michael P. Jackson,
Deputy Sec’y, Dep’t of Transp. (Sept. 28, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/postreview/
coastguard_tank_level_rtnltr.html (recognizing that the agency is trying to meet a judicial deadline for a
rule required by statute, but still focusing on the failure to establish net benefits with the rule choice and
considering “legislative relief”).
161. See Letter from Susan E. Dudley, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Stephen L.
Johnson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (July 10, 2008), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
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statutes such as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act162 or the Paperwork
Reduction Act that gave birth to OIRA.163 But more often the office seems to be
using its power under relevant executive orders or OMB circulars to interpret
substantive statutes within an agency’s delegated domain and expertise.164
Let us give some examples: In an October 30, 2007 return letter addressed to
the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce regarding a rule about
coastal fisheries proposed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the then-OIRA Administrator stated that one ground for returning the rule was that it was “not consistent with NOAA’s authority to regulate
the fishery under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.”165 Similarly, in a September 14,
2001 return letter addressed to the General Counsel of the Department of
Veterans Affairs, one ground for rejecting a proposed rule that would have
created presumptions about whether a potential beneficiary was entitled to

postreview/OIRA_letter_to_EPA_7_10_08.pdf (taking a position on the substantive reach of the Clean
Air Act); Letter from Susan E. Dudley, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Stephen L.
Johnson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Mar. 12, 2008), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
postreview/Steve_Johnson_Letter_on_NAAQs_final _3-13-08_2.pdf (same); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Rosalind A. Knapp, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t
of Transp. (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/dot_return_vessels.pdf
(returning rule because of inconsistency with congressional intent); Letter from John D. Graham,
Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Rosalind A. Knapp, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of
Transp. (June 13, 2003), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/return-dot061303.pdf (returning rule because regulation “establish[es] requirements inconsistent with Congressional intent”); Letter
from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Hector V. Barreto, Adm’r, Small
Bus. Admin. (Feb. 11, 2002), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/sba_eidl_rtnltr.html
(returning a rule in part because the proposal threatens to take a congressional program beyond its
“original intent”); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Tim
McClain, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs (Sept. 14, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/return/permanent_and_total_disability_va_return_letter.html (returning rule because of concerns
about the right interpretation of statutes administered by the VA).
162. See Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Kirk K. Van
Tine, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Transp. (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/
dot_revised_tire_rtnltr.pdf (enforcing Unfunded Mandates Reform Act but also appealing to the authority of Executive Order 12,866).
163. See Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Mary
Glenn-Croft, Special Advisor to the Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin. (Sept. 27, 2001), available at http://
www.reginfo.gov/public/return/ssa_4rules_rtnltr.html (returning rule to the Social Security Administration to enforce compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act).
164. See Letter from Susan E. Dudley, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Gus
Coldebella, Acting Gen. Counsel & Regulatory Policy Officer, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 13,
2008), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ return/DHS-CBP_Coastwise_Cruises_Return_Letter.
pdf (returning rule to enforce agency compliance with Executive Order 12,866 and OMB Circular A-4);
Letter from Susan E. Dudley, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to John J. Sullivan, Gen.
Counsel, Dep’t of Commerce (Oct. 30, 2007), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/return_
doc_20071030.pdf (returning rule to enforce compliance with Executive Order 12,866, as amended by
Executive Order 13,422); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Hector V. Barreto, Adm’r, Small Bus. Admin. (Feb. 11, 2002), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
return/sba_eidl_rtnltr.html (returning rule to encourage agency to comply with OMB Circular A-129).
165. Letter from Susan E. Dudley, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to John J. Sullivan,
Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Commerce (Oct. 30, 2007), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/
return_doc_20071030.pdf.
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disability benefits was that the rule “would contradict the statutory authority
and intent of the program.”166 This goes beyond what Lisa Heinzerling observed when she was able to obtain the record of OIRA’s review of EPA’s
power-plant cooling rule,167 in that these traces of OIRA’s substantive interpretation of agency statutes do not involve engrafting cost–benefit analysis in
statutory regimes where it does not apply. Rather, they evidence OIRA taking
(and enforcing) positions on the scope of delegation effectuated by a congressional act and on Congress’s legislative intent.
The repository also suggests OIRA involvement in the quasi-constitutional
domains of federalism and preemption.168 Although these matters are covered
by an Executive Order and a guidance document from OMB,169 OIRA is
technically responsible for their enforcement. Accordingly, OIRA’s preferences
on federalism and preemption can be superimposed upon agency decisionmaking.170
OIRA also takes upon itself enforcement of treaties and consideration of
other international concerns. Thus, in a September 20, 2001 return letter to the
Deputy General Counsel of the Department of Transportation (DOT), OIRA
relied primarily on potential inconsistency between the proposed rule and the
obligations of the United States under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).171 Similarly, OIRA returned another proposed DOT rule because of potential “adverse international consequences” and because of a need

166. Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Tim McClain,
Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs (Sept. 14, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
return/permanent_and_total_disability_va_return_letter.html.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 141–43.
168. See supra note 133.
169. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 807–09
(2012); Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts
and Agencies, and Indep. Regulatory Agencies, Guidance for Implementing E.O. 13132, “Federalism”
(Oct. 28, 1999), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/m0002.pdf.
170. For examples from the repository, see Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. &
Regulatory Affairs, to Alphonso Jackson, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (Mar. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/postreview/hud_response9.pdf (preemption); Letter from
John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Tracy Mehan, Assistant Adm’r for
Water, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/epa_
water_quality_rtnltr.html (federalism and tribal lands). Catherine Sharkey has offered a careful assessment of OIRA’s role in these matters based on in-depth interviews with agency officials and OIRA
personnel. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521
(2012). Sharkey argues that OIRA does very little to enforce the relevant Executive Order, but there is
at least some evidence of attention to federalism and preemption in the letters from the repository.
Rather than insisting that a sentence or two in the repository letters is itself a cause for direct concern
about what OIRA is doing about enforcing the executive orders on federalism and preemption, we
observe only that an OIRA unbound—unmoored from regleprudential norms—could be engaging in a
lot of jurisgenerative action in the domains in which it has legal enforcement authority.
171. See Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Rosalind A.
Knapp, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Transp. (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/return/fra_dispatching_rtnltr-dot.html.
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to comply with “applicable international trade agreements.”172 And these
examples are not the only instances of OIRA insinuating international legal
considerations into its regulatory review.173 It is not entirely clear that these
matters fall within the jurisdictional grants to OIRA under Executive Orders
13,563 and 12,866. But OIRA is making law in these domains, nevertheless.
What this repository seemingly confirms, with its fish-eye lens into OIRA
review (which we perfectly well concede may project a distorted image), is that
OIRA’s legal function is wide ranging, covering procedural and substantive
matters across a number of domains. Together with other evidence and the
structure of OIRA review, it is clear that OIRA represents an important and
active legal institution within the Executive Branch, no less significant (and
arguably much more significant) than OLC and other offices that have received
the lion’s share of attention by scholars and practitioners. Recognizing this legal
function now allows us to return to the questions we raised at the outset about
how to analyze this kind of law from the perspective of rule-of-law values like
consistency, reason-giving, and transparency.174
III. REGLEPRUDENCE: STARE DECISIS AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
Because regulatory review places OIRA in the position to interpret important
legal questions, we have warrant to ask whether traditional jurisprudential
concerns grounded in values such as consistency, reason-giving, and transparency can be applied across different modalities of lawmaking at OIRA.175 And
different modalities of lawmaking may counsel for different techniques of
172. Letter from Donald R. Arbuckle, Deputy Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Rosalind A. Knapp, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Transp. (July 20, 2001), available at http://
www.reginfo.gov/public/return/faa_repair_stations_rtnltr-dot.html.
173. See, e.g., Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Rosalind
A. Knapp, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Transp. (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.reginfo.
gov/public/return/dot_return_vessels.pdf (returning rule because it “undermine[s] foreign policy objectives”).
174. One objection to our characterization of OIRA as an institution engaged in lawmaking might be
that OIRA’s role is inchoate and ultimately advisory, as the OLC memo on regulatory review and the
text of Executive Order 12,866 seem to suggest. There is plenty of evidence, however, that OIRA’s
pronouncements on legal matters carry significant—indeed, perhaps determinative—weight within the
Executive Branch. Moreover, the simple realpolitik of OIRA’s gatekeeping function suggests that it
carries great leverage in conflicts with agencies. Finally, the kinds of regleprudential questions we think
appropriate to ask of OIRA’s legal function are not dependent on that legal function having finality in
the sense of a judicial decision, enacted legislation, or even final agency action. Given OIRA’s
inherently predicate role in the regulatory process, its influence on the law within the Executive
Branch—and ultimately beyond—will always take place through the iterative process it oversees.
175. In a recent article, Catherine Sharkey suggests that courts ought to take a harder look at agency
action when that action has not been first reviewed by the Executive through its mechanisms of
regulatory oversight like OIRA. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”:
Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589 (2014). If
OIRA review is to be taken to have legal relevance (and the hydraulics of deference and judicial review
is going to be responsive to OIRA oversight), that is all the more reason not to accede to the view of
OIRA review as merely political. Conformity with regleprudential norms at OIRA could help reinforce
the institution’s significance during judicial review, where applicable.
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hewing to precedent or other rule-of-law values. The primary question in this
Part, then, is whether OIRA’s lawmaking carries any precedential effect and
whether the law made there ought to engender stare decisis-like treatment. As
we discuss, precedent, reason-giving, and transparency have the potential to
work together (or as substitutes) in OIRA’s balancing the need for rule of law
with the need for effective executive action. From these discussions, we recommend some reforms to improve OIRA’s role in controlling a legitimate administrative state from a regleprudential perspective.
A. MODALITIES OF LAWMAKING AT OIRA: QUASI-ADJUDICATION, QUASI-ENFORCEMENT,
AND QUASI-RULEMAKING

Through a regleprudential lens, OIRA can be seen to be engaged in three
types of lawmaking. Often, OIRA’s legal interventions occur through individualized reviews of other agencies’ rulemaking processes. One might call this
mode of review quasi-adjudication. From another perspective, to the extent that
OIRA is engaging in enforcing and implementing various executive orders,176
the Paperwork Reduction Act,177 the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,178 and
OMB circulars and guidance documents,179 we might conceptualize its work as
quasi-enforcement, with enforcement aimed at other Executive Branch instrumentalities. Both quasi-enforcement and quasi-adjudication naturally prime consideration of the extent to which precedent ought to play a role in decisionmaking
precisely because the workaday use of precedent in adjudication and enforcement inside and outside the judiciary (and the Department of Justice) is hardly

176. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
802–06 (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
807–09 (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497,
3 C.F.R. 218 (2010), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816 (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R.
215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816–17 (2012).
177. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2012); see also, e.g., Letter from
John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Mary Glenn-Croft, Special Advisor to
the Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin. (Sept. 27, 2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/
ssa_4rules_rtnltr.html (returning rule to enforce compliance with Paperwork Reduction Act).
178. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.); see also, e.g., Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. &
Regulatory Affairs, to Kirk K. Van Tine, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Transp. (Feb. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/dot_revised_tire_rtnltr.pdf (enforcing Unfunded Mandates Reform Act but also appealing to authority of Executive Order 12,866).
179. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-129,
POLICIES FOR FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS AND NON-TAX RECEIVABLES (2013); CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 93;
Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and
Agencies, Open Government Directive (Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/
documents/open-government-directive; see also Letter from Susan E. Dudley, Adm’r, Office of Info. &
Regulatory Affairs, to Gus Coldebella, Acting Gen. Counsel & Regulatory Policy Officer, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. (Aug. 13, 2008), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/DHS-CBP_Coastwise_
Cruises_ Return_Letter.pdf (returning rule to enforce agency compliance with Executive Order 12,866
and OMB Circular A-4); Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Hector V. Barreto, Adm’r, Small Bus. Admin. (Feb. 11, 2002), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
return/sba_eidl_rtnltr.html (returning rule to encourage agency to comply with OMB Circular A-129).
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controversial. Recall that even at the NLRB—where stare decisis is extremely
light—some special hoop jumping is necessary to move off matters already
decided.180 Thus, although these modalities of lawmaking—quasi-adjudication
and quasi-enforcement—recommend some form of stare decisis, much more
work would be necessary to settle on just the right form: neither absolute stare
decisis that statutory decisions get in the courts, nor ad hoc decisionmaking with
no reference to prior decisions make sense. We will return to these and related
questions shortly.181
Yet there is also another modality of decisionmaking and lawmaking at
OIRA: what we might call quasi-rulemaking. Quasi-rulemaking, unlike quasiadjudication and quasi-enforcement, involves the development of principles,
guidance, checklists, and information about how future adjudications and enforcement will proceed. It is usually divorced from specific reviews of agency
activities, though of course prior experience in enforcement and adjudicative
actions provides meaningful background for the development of prospective
rules.
The Obama Administration’s OIRA has thus far chosen to issue few “formal”
letters in quasi-adjudicative processes. Although OIRA’s work remains principally the review of agency rulemakings, only one return letter appears from
2011.182 Given that public interactions with agencies provide a source of law to
help agencies anticipate and plan for OIRA review and understand its priorities,
we might have expected a law professor-OIRA Administrator—Cass Sunstein—to contribute more than one letter to the repository of common law. To
be sure, a previous Administrator observed that OIRA “ha[s] witnessed some
agencies simply withdrawing rules rather than face a public return letter,”183 so
it could be that agencies are trying to avoid public flogging with return letters or
review letters.
Yet Sunstein chose to communicate with agencies through trans-substantive
memoranda rather than through the letter form: quasi-rules, in our typology,
rather than the quasi-adjudications contained in the repository.184 These also

180. See supra section I.C.
181. See infra section III.B.1.
182. See supra note 88.
183. See Mannix, supra note 148, at 14 (quoting former OIRA Administrator John Graham).
184. See, e.g., Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, Cumulative Effects of Regulations (Mar. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/cumulative-effects-guidance.pdf; Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts
and Agencies, and Indep. Regulatory Agencies, Executive Order 13563, “Improving Regulation and
Regulatory Review” (Feb. 2, 2011), available at http://www.va.gov/ORPM/docs/EO_OIRA_Guidance_
M11-10.pdf; Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, and Indep. Regulatory Agencies, Facilitating Scientific Research by Streamlining the Paperwork Reduction Act Process (Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://www.
regulationwriters.com/downloads/OIRA-M-11-07-Facilitating-Scientific-Research-by-Streamlining-thePRA-Process-12-9-10.pdf; Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory
Affairs, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, and Indep. Regulatory Agencies, Information Collec-
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provide guidance and are a source of law for agencies to follow, although they
are less easy to find, less focused on specific statutory commands, and less
calibrated to specific decisionmaking tasks agencies are already in the process
of facing.185 It is hard to tell on the cold record if anything informal changed
under Sunstein—he certainly published many speeches to give some insight
into how he was running the office186—but his formal actions differed in their
effective withdrawal from the repository of letters collected, published, and
publicized since the Bush Administration,187 preferring the form of the memorandum.188
To give a feel for what we are calling “quasi-rulemaking,” consider Sunstein’s memorandum of June 18, 2010, on “Disclosure and Simplification as
Regulatory Tools.”189 Drawing on OIRA’s presumptive authority under Executive Order 12,866—and relevant directives issued by President Obama and
OMB190—Sunstein issued “principles” about disclosure and simplification that
“agencies should follow.”191 Although a later clarifying memorandum was
said to be a product of “input from, among others, the National Science and
Technology Council’s Task Force on Smart Disclosure,”192 there is no evidence
of any process—notice and comment or otherwise—that led to these trans-

tion Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (Apr. 7, 2010), available at http://www.regulationwriters.com/
downloads/OIRA-PRA-Primer-4-7-10.pdf; Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of
Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, and Indep. Regulatory Agencies,
Paperwork Reduction Act—Generic Clearances (May 28, 2010), available at http://www.regulation
writers.com/downloads/OIRA-PRA-Generic-ICRs-5-28-2010.pdf; Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, and Indep.
Regulatory Agencies, Social Media, Web-Based Interactive Technologies, and the Paperwork Reduction Act (Apr. 7, 2010), available at http://www.regulationwriters.com/downloads/OIRA-SocialMedia-Guidance-4-7-10.pdf; Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, and of the Indep. Regulatory Comm’ns, Testing
and Simplifying Federal Forms (Aug. 9, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/inforeg/memos/testing-and-simplifying-federal-forms.pdf.
185. As noted, there are other memoranda and circulars promulgated by OMB that govern aspects
of rulemaking and agency practice. See supra text accompanying notes 92–94. These could also be
considered quasi-rulemaking in our typology.
186. Sunstein’s speeches are collected at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_speeches/.
187. See supra note 149.
188. At this stage of our research, we cannot discern whether acting through memorandum rather
than letter makes a difference on the ground. For now, we observe these different modes of lawmaking,
so they can be subjected to comparative analysis in the future.
189. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Heads
of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, Disclosure and Simplification as Regulatory Tools (June 18, 2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure_principles.pdf.
190. See Memorandum from Barack Obama, President of the U.S., to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and
Agencies, Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment; Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 179.
191. See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 189, at 1–2.
192. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Heads
of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, Informing Consumers Through Smart Disclosure 2 (Sept. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/informing-consumersthrough-smart-disclosure.pdf.
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substantive disclosure and simplification principles Sunstein announced by
memorandum.
From one standpoint, the substance of the principles on summary disclosure
seem intuitive: agencies should know why they are forcing disclosure; agencies
should promote simple and specific disclosure, accurate and in plain language;
agencies should consider the timing and placement of disclosed information;
ratings and scales should be easy to understand and have reference to benchmarks that matter; agencies should test the effects of disclosure and monitor
disclosure’s effects over time; and agencies should do cost–benefit analyses
about disclosure strategies.193 Yet there is no doubt that these are substantive
and normative choices, and an agency’s command from a statute may recommend a different set of principles that might be derived in a way that transsubstantive principles cannot always easily accommodate. Notwithstanding a
disclaimer in the memorandum that “[a]gencies should follow the principles
outlined here in accordance with their own authorities, judgments, and goals, to
the extent permitted by law,”194 there is no doubt that the memorandum sets the
agenda for OIRA’s analysis of proposed rules involving summary disclosure.
When the FDA or NHTSA take to rulemaking about tobacco labeling, foodnutrition labeling, or energy-efficiency labeling, for example, the Sunstein
memo becomes the document to comply with or to contend with, rather than a
focus on the role of disclosure in the organic statute or comprehensive statutory
scheme. The agency will now need to explain why it is departing from the
“Sunstein principles,” if it chooses to.
The “simplification” principles are even more clearly substantive and normatively contestable. In these norms of guidance to agency heads, Sunstein
informs regulators that they ought to be considering “opt-out” default rules to
help nudge people to make the choices regulators may prefer, as well as “active
choosing” to mitigate the effects of bias towards default rules.195 The memorandum also encourages agencies to consider default rules instead of mandates
or bans.196 One could be forgiven for thinking that Sunstein—with an identical
disclaimer here that “[a]gencies should follow the principles outlined here in
accordance with their own authorities, judgments, and goals, to the extent
permitted by law”197—is writing into law a version of one of his own recent
books.198 One can celebrate and admire Sunstein’s (and Thaler’s) Nudge and
still think some public participatory procedure ought to have been followed
before it got pride of place in a memorandum all federal executive agency heads
must follow or justify departing from. In any case, the Sunstein memoranda and

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 189, at 3–6.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 9–10.
See id. at 10.
Id. at 9.
See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
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the Sunstein principles articulated therein are modes of lawmaking that take the
form of quasi-rules.
B. CALIBRATING STARE DECISIS AT OIRA

Whichever modality of regleprudential development is more effective or
democratically justifiable—quasi-adjudications, quasi-enforcement, or quasirulemaking—OIRA is developing a law of sorts. The question for this section is
whether the results of these methods of lawmaking are entitled to any precedential effect. In the alternative, when stare decisis seems like the wrong
approach, is there another technique—reason-giving or transparency for the
agencies OIRA oversees and for the public, most notably—that can build off of
commonly held rule-of-law values to help tame the law being made by OIRA?199
1. Precedent in Three Modalities of Lawmaking
In section I.C above, we introduced the idea of applying stare decisis—to
stand by things decided—into the inner workings of the administrative state,
especially in domains outside the regular scope of judicial review. We provided
reasons to think that corners of the Executive Branch that actually issue
authoritative decisions that bind governmental and private actors—structuring
their primary conduct—could benefit from a regleprudential commitment to the
same rule-of-law values prevalent within the judicial system that underwrite the
doctrine of stare decisis there. For many of the same reasons that the use of
precedent as binding makes sense in courts, the Executive Branch might be seen
as subject to a general principle to stand by things decided, even if the contours
of the form of stare decisis have yet to be articulated. Whether it is to save
decision costs, promote the independent value of consistency, provide a focal
point for coordination, respect and channel reliance, or because something
about the concept of “law” requires it, domains of the administrative state
mostly immune from judicial review still need to be thinking about the law they
are making as law. As such, law of this sort should be refracted through the
value (and costs) of adhering to precedent. It is not, of course, our view that all
law is the same and that all law must respect precedent in the same way to
vindicate rule-of-law values. The role of precedent will likely vary across the
three different modalities of lawmaking at OIRA, as will the trade-offs between
standing by things decided and competing values of creativity, flexibility, and
the political accountability that comes from being able to depart from such
precedent in response to democratic shifts.
Consider what we have called quasi-adjudication, which has at times been
memorialized in the letters that OIRA writes when it returns rules to agencies

199. To be clear, we are not arguing that OIRA simply ignores all past practice. Rather, we are
beginning with the proposition that OIRA does not appear to conceive of stare decisis as an essential
aspect of its decisional considerations, so we are outlining where precedent might play a more
self-conscious role.

300

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 103:259

and when after a review it wishes for the agency to continue to think through
its regulatory approach. Should the legal order OIRA imposes through these
reviews be considered a system of precedent that future quasi-adjudications
should respect in some form? We think that makes a lot of sense. Such a legal
order would save decision costs for decision makers with many different jobs
and tight deadlines; it would promote the independent value of consistency; it
would facilitate coordination; and it would help respect and channel agencies’
reliance. It would, moreover, pay homage to the simple reality that many
quasi-adjudications involve contestable interpretations of statutes, executive
orders, circulars, and guidance memoranda. Rather than allowing politics to
overwhelm the process of regulatory review, treating the law made with precedential effect serves the further goal of legitimating the power of the Executive
Branch in its oversight over the agencies.
This does not, of course, mean that stare decisis ought to function identically
within OIRA as it does in a court of appeals, binding future panels and requiring
elaborate processes—like en banc review200—to overturn a decision already
made. There is no denying that OIRA is, in part, a political office with an
obligation to represent the views of the President, views that can (and do)
legitimately change between and even within administrations.201 And some of
the arguments against the relevance of precedent grounded in rationales of
expertise apply to aspects of OIRA’s oversight.202 But it does mean that,
with those caveats, the arguments that make stare decisis a good rule of thumb
in courts can carry over to quasi-adjudications within OIRA. And this is the
bulk of OIRA’s work day-to-day. If OIRA’s view about what NAFTA requires
changes day-to-day with no notice or reason-giving, this could upset the smooth
functioning of the bureaucracy and the private ordering that relies on it.
Given that we began by comparing OIRA to the Office of Legal Counsel, we
can see now that although OLC presents itself as an easy case for a practice of
stare decisis, there are reasons that OIRA might be an even better locus for
respecting stare decisis in the Executive Branch. First, the role that OLC
lawyers assume is one of counsel and prediction. By contrast, OIRA’s work in
overseeing regulatory review, enforcing relevant executive orders, and controlling the bureaucracy at the highest level, by adjudicating disputes among
agencies about which has jurisdiction over certain kinds of activities under a

200. See generally Alexandra Sadinsky, Note, Redefining En Banc Review in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001 (2014).
201. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984)
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”).
202. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 604 (1987) (“[A]t least one version of
the ideal of the administrative process holds that an agency should be free to consider the fullness of
certain problems without the constraints of following its or another agency’s prior handling of a
different array of highly complex facts.”).
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cluster of complex statutes, takes on a more immediate character of legal practice. It may be that OLC similarly sees itself as an adjudicator of sorts in
sensitive political cases where courts are actually unlikely to intervene. But
OIRA is a frontline decision maker; it does not see its principal role as
prediction of what courts would do. This may compel even more attention to the
practice of precedent at OIRA.
Moreover, one plausible story about why stare decisis is rational rather than
arbitrary is that the first decision maker witnessed and participated in a proper
adversarial process that reinforces confidence in and reliability of the primary
decision. In OIRA, it is possible that there is more adversary process—with
better representation of the relevant interested parties—than there is at OLC,
where a difficult question of who the actual “client” is prevails.203 Lawyers at
OLC are, at once, representing the President, the Law, the Constitution, and the
People.204 This confuses their work—and disables proper deliberation among
and with potential stakeholders. That furnishes yet another reason to give stare
decisis pride of place within OIRA: although both OLC and OIRA are “braintrusts” of a sort, OIRA is expected to deliberatively engage persons and entities
controlled by their decisions in a way OLC is not. This is a reason to think
agencies actually ought to be bound by the legal decisionmaking at OIRA, and
OIRA ought to give greater respect to the accretion of its decisional resources
over time.
It is also useful to think about calibrating stare decisis within the domain of
what we have called quasi-enforcement. In this arena, there are reasons to think
that the Executive Branch needs more discretion.205 Just as prosecutors and
police have wide berths to consider individual factual contexts without a lot of
worry about whether a charging decision is consistent with or establishes
precedent, to the extent that what OIRA does is “enforce” in the way prosecutors and police do, perhaps OIRA ought to be given a corollary of “prosecutorial
discretion.” Indeed, prompt letters are perhaps a domain where OIRA should
not be shackled by precedent because it is clearer in that context that the
ultimate decision about how to proceed rests with the agency being given a
prompt, which is really meant to be a preliminary signal rather than an adjudication of the merits of agency action.
Yet it does not follow that precedential thinking is wholly irrelevant in
quasi-enforcement. There is good reason for Executive Branch actors to be clear

203. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1352.
204. See Bruce Ackerman, Presidential Power Grabs: Their Causes and Cure, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 10, 2014, 8:34 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-ackerman/presidential-power-grabs
_2_b_4759352.html?view⫽print&comm_ref⫽false; cf. HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2009) (highlighting the structural reasons presidents get bad advice from
their Offices of Legal Counsel).
205. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). For a useful critique highlighting how
lawmaking and policymaking pervades agency prosecutorial discretion, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, ThreeBranch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157 (1996).
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about enforcement priorities so that primary conduct can acclimate to the
enforcement environment.206 After all, repeat players—which Executive Branch
agencies no doubt are—do watch patterns of enforcement and learn from them.
Accordingly, when an administration wants to shuffle resources to enforce
certain kinds of laws less aggressively than others, it is often (though not
always) better for decision costs, consistency, coordination, and reliance interests for actors to be on notice about how enforcement is likely to proceed. So
too within OIRA: although there is a vast range of quasi-enforcement that can
be indifferent to precedent, the office’s priorities can be usefully memorialized
in guidance and policy documents that help agencies learn how to behave and
comply. It is for this reason that OIRA sometimes enters into memoranda of
understanding with agencies to help streamline particularized regulatory review.207
Quasi-regulations seem closer to quasi-enforcement than to quasi-adjudication. Again here—and perhaps more clearly so—the tight force of precedent as
constraining the application of legal norms ought to be substituted by a more
limited requirement of reason-giving and transparency. That a policy or guidance document has been settled one way is not a decisive reason to settle it the
same way when the question arises again if political or technological winds
have shifted, revealing new regulatory priorities. Yet the exercise of legal power
that coerces other actors still must cohere with the standard rule-of-law values
that in adjudication and quasi-adjudication command some adherence to stare
decisis.
Yet, rule-of-law values also suggest some role for letting things decided stand
even in the realm of quasi-regulation. To wit, when a new Administrator is
appointed at OIRA (or a new desk officer takes over a policy area), it likely
makes sense to let old documents and policy-guidance memoranda remain valid
until revisited carefully, so long as the original “enactment” followed the right
process. Just because OIRA undergoes an internal shift does not mean the entire
federal bureaucracy should have to immediately suffer destabilization.
Across all three modalities, however, hewing to past practice has costs as
well as benefits,208 and departures can be justified. Here, it is possible to recognize a kind of hydraulic trade-off among stare decisis, reason-giving, and
transparency. In some instances, all of these rule-of-law values can be served
simultaneously; in other contexts, they can serve as substitutes. As the NLRB
example—and similar practice across a range of traditional administrative
realms—illustrates,209 departures from past practice place a particular burden of
notice and explanation on legal actors.
The general argument for such reason-giving by OIRA in its capacity as a

206.
207.
208.
209.

See generally Andrias, supra note 76.
For examples, see supra note 92.
See infra section III.B.3.
See supra text accompanying notes 52–56.
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legal actor echoes the same imperative in other legal contexts.210 Reasongiving, of course, enables meaningful reliance on the decision made, helps
justify binding agencies in the future, and provides an organized way to depart
from precedent when that is salutary. Public reason-giving, moreover, by exposing legal decisionmaking to question and contestation, stands to improve that
decisionmaking. There is also arguably a dignitary interest at play as well for
those affected by a legal process. This is not to make a strictly instrumental
argument for a kind of efficiency-of-rights approach to OIRA’s legal function,
to echo David Super.211 Normative legitimation can derive from the iterative
nature of reason-giving and response.212
Whatever independent value inheres in reason-giving, across all three modalities, it is doubly necessary when OIRA departs from past practice. This is
perhaps easiest to see in the realm of quasi-adjudication. If the agencies subject
to OIRA oversight enter regulatory review with a sense of how OIRA has
approached particular legal questions in the past, any departure in the context of
a given regulatory action should be explained and justified. This should not
cabin discretion any more than the similar mandate does for agencies; however,
it should require some articulation of the reason for a departure.213
This value of transparency applies as well to OIRA’s quasi-enforcement
work. Enforcement has effects on people’s organization of their primary conduct enough that actors are entitled to feel that enforcement agencies are
constrained by some rule-of-law priorities. Transparency about how enforcement resources will be focused within an administration can thus substitute for
the constraining role of precedent if the exercise of discretion requires more
flexibility.
210. See generally Mathilde Cohen, Reason-Giving in Court Practice: Decision-Makers at the
Crossroads, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 257 (2008); Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When
May Legal Decision Makers Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091 (2010); Mathilde Cohen, The Rule of Law as
the Rule of Reasons, 96 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS—UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 1 (2010).
211. See generally David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of
Individual Rights, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2005).
212. Jeremy Waldron has argued that agency—in the individual sense—is critical to Rule of Law (as
he capitalizes it), and the same argument can apply to those institutional actors subject to oversight
within the administrative state:
The publicity of [legal] norms is not just a matter of pragmatic administrative convenience
along the lines of its being easier to govern people if they know what is expected of them. It
embodies a fundamental point about the way in which the systems we call “legal systems”
operate. They operate by using, rather than suppressing and short-circuiting, the responsible
agency of ordinary human individuals. Ruling by law is quite different from herding cows
with a cattle prod or directing a flock of sheep with a dog. It is also quite different from
eliciting a reflex recoil with a scream of command. The publicity and generality of law look to
what Henry Hart and Albert Sacks called “self application,” that is, to people’s capacities for
practical understanding, for self-control, and for the self-monitoring and modulation of their
own behavior, in relation to norms that they can grasp and understand.
Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2008).
213. Again, transparency here is important both for the administrative entities that OIRA oversees
and for the general public that will eventually be bound by OIRA’s understanding of the law.
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Finally, in quasi-regulation, because the initial position of the office is
publicly articulated in the first instance, that transparency raises the importance
of articulating reasons for departure from past practice. This reflects a broader
insight—within realms more traditionally subject to judicial review—that
agencies engaging in rulemaking or other final agency action binding on the
general public may depart from past agency practice but cannot do so without a
reasoned explanation.214 In this way, reason-giving and stare decisis operate as
counterweights in constraining agency action: to the extent that an Executive
Branch actor chooses to reject precedent, it must, at a minimum, state that it is
doing so and explain why.215
Consistency and transparency can thus form a balance and an equilibrium
that, in some aspects of OIRA’s work, suggest that both reason-giving and
respect for precedent must be enhanced, whereas in other contexts, clear
articulation with the right process may be enough to justify change. These
regleprudential insights help sketch a reform agenda for OIRA to which we now
turn.
2.

OIRA Reform in Regleprudential Terms

The conceptual apparatus we have sketched thus far suggests a regleprudential reform agenda for OIRA that can better reflect core rule-of-law values of
consistency and transparency.216 As we have discussed, OIRA has been the
214. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (“[T]he requirement that an
agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness
that it is changing position. An agency may not, for example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or
simply disregard rules that are still on the books.”). In Fox, the majority rejected the proposition that
there was any heightened burden on agencies to explain an agency change of position, but reiterated the
longstanding proposition that norms of reason-giving in judicial review of agency action require
addressing the fact of change. Id. at 515–16. See generally Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 54 (arguing
that agencies should have a higher burden of justification when engaging in “expository” reasoning—
interpreting sources of law—as opposed to “prescriptive” reasoning, which involves evidence, expertise, and policy choices).
In some ways, our interests here align with “the Accardi principle,” the principle that agencies need
to follow their own rules. See generally United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260
(1954) (deciding when agencies need to follow their own rules); Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi
Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569 (2006) (exploring the contours of the under-theorized decision in
Accardi and its progeny). Some refer to this idea as “the Arizona Grocery principle.” See, e.g., STEPHEN
G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 438–79
(6th ed. 2006) (referencing and discussing Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.,
284 U.S. 370 (1932)). Ultimately, although clarifying the justifications for these principles would be
productive for regleprudence, because the principle is really about devising rules for the judicial review
of when agencies depart from their previous practices, Accardi and Arizona Grocery are mainline
administrative law rather than what we are calling regleprudence.
215. Moreover, quasi-rulemaking raises the additional rule-of-law concern that there is no mechanism for challenging any abrogation of authority, raising the value of transparency all the more.
216. While we can defend the valence of these particular rule-of-law values, we acknowledge that
the generality of the concept of rule of law might lead others to a different set of prescriptions for
constraining Executive Branch legal decisions. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative
State Is Inconsistent with the Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 491 (2008). Indeed, some think the
rule of law is essentially about accountability mechanisms that are largely meant to be effectuated
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subject of sustained criticism not only for its antiregulatory bias, but also for the
overly politicized nature of its regulatory review and the office’s opacity, both
to the public and to the agencies it oversees.217 Two related strands of reform
could form the core of a strategy that would respond to these critiques: a
commitment by the office to public reason-giving for its legal functions and a
related recognition that transparency carries with it a need to justify variations
from precedent.218
As a first step in implementing a commitment to reason-giving, OIRA could
return to—and build on—the simple promise of transparency embodied in the
original text of Executive Order 12,866.219 Recall that the Executive Order was
drafted to mandate, at a minimum, written notification to agencies of the result
(or waiver) of OIRA review as well as a “written explanation” for any regulatory action that is returned to an agency specifying the pertinent Executive
Order provision being invoked.220 As we have discussed, there was at least a
small period during which OIRA complied with this mandate for at least some
of its rules, although that window has largely closed.221
There is a related, although rarely discussed, mandate in Executive Order
12,866 that, unlike review and return letters, has been largely ignored to our
knowledge.222 In section 6(b)(4)(D), the Executive Order mandates that:
After the regulatory action has been published in the Federal Register or
otherwise issued to the public, or after the agency has announced its decision
not to publish or issue the regulatory action, OIRA shall make available to the
public all documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency during the
review by OIRA under this section.223

through judicial review. See, e.g., William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 723. We
hope our lens into the rule of law here exposes how regleprudence is rooted in rule-of-law values but
does not rely principally on judicial review.
217. See supra section II.A.2.
218. To be clear, much of what we are advocating in this section is not new. Academics, advocates,
the General Accountability Office, and the Administrative Conference of the United States have sought
to bring transparency and consistency to OIRA. What is novel about our prescriptions is their
grounding in an explicit recognition of OIRA’s critical role as a legal institution and in a category of
analysis we are calling regleprudence.
219. Lisa Heinzerling has made a similar observation about the failed promise of the Executive
Order’s commitment to transparency. See Heinzerling, Inside EPA, supra note 6, at 365.
220. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
221. See supra section II.C.
222. To the extent that this provision tends to warrant mention in the literature on OIRA, it is
generally in passing. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of
Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1164 (2014). This is perhaps because the provision has been
so roundly ignored by the office itself in practice.
223. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. 638, 648 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 806 (2012). As noted, some redline/strikeout versions of rules that reflect OIRA review are
available, but give little context for the substantive choices associated with those line edits and little
explanation for why the rules are being changed.

306

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 103:259

Compliance with this important requirement would fundamentally transform OIRA’s work, both for the agencies it oversees and for the public that is
eventually subject to the legal interpretation that OIRA imbeds in the rules it
reviews.224
Although there exists a repository of review and return letters, the value of
those letters is quite limited given how few there are and how uniformly cursory
are their explanations. Indeed, once one removes the introductory and hortatory
concluding language from the letters, each contains a bare few paragraphs, at
best, of substance. Accordingly, a second step in embracing the value of
public reason-giving would involve actually giving real detail about the nature
of the review, the substance of OIRA’s concerns, the “precedent” on which
OIRA relied, and the lessons—in a common law way—that the individual
quasi-adjudication might hold for subsequent regulatory actions. Scholars have
raised significant concerns in recent years about the increasingly summary
nature of the dispositions courts are undertaking, undermining their value in
undergirding the rule of law,225 and the same concerns recommend that OIRA
provide reasoned substance as it puzzles through the challenging oversight it
undertakes. Flexibility is one thing and arbitrariness another; one is a virtue, the
other implicates the legitimacy of a government.
We acknowledge, of course, that OIRA is not a judicial institution, and we
are not advocating the equivalent of judicial decisions for each instance of
regulatory review. There are certainly other practical ways for OIRA to provide
notice and a reasoned body of practice to the agencies it oversees. OIRA
conducts a significant number of reviews, and even at the height of the era in

224. In recent years, OIRA has created an online interface that gives the illusion of transparency by
providing real-time data on all rules undergoing regulatory review under Executive Order No. 12,866.
For a link to OIRA’s regulatory review “dashboard,” see Regulatory Review Dashboard, OFF. INFO. &
REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/eoDashboard.jsp (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). In truth,
this online record says essentially nothing substantive, neither providing access to any communications
with agencies nor, more importantly, even the cursory substance that was for a short period of time
available through review and return letters.
Another element of nominal OIRA transparency that also seems illusory is the mandated log of
external communications. OIRA purports to make available a list of meetings with non-Executive
Branch personnel and oral communications received during regulatory review, as required by Executive
Order 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(C), 3 C.F.R. at 647–48. Given the volume of regulatory review, however, it is
striking how relatively few of such contacts are logged. It is difficult to determine whether the paucity
of such records indicates that OIRA maintains very little contact with outside constituencies, of
course, but it is certainly possible that compliance with this requirement of the Executive Order is not
complete.
225. There is a significant body of literature debating the merits of the rise of both nonprecedential,
unpublished decisionmaking at the appellate level and a host of related summary dispositional practices
that undermine the public-reasoning nature of the judicial enterprise. See, e.g., Rex R. Perschbacher &
Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); William M. Richman & William L.
Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996).
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which OIRA was providing return and review letters, those letters covered only
a tiny fraction of relevant regulatory actions.226
Rather, OIRA could accomplish this reform through some kind of periodic
or topical cumulative restatement of its “common law,” referencing and digesting some universe of particular prior reviews (its quasi-adjudications).
OIRA could then draw from what is most rule of law-like in the promulgation
of its quasi-regulations, providing a period for agencies to comment on this
restatement, which would give OIRA input that could refine the office’s future
work on a given statutory regime or regulatory domain. We imagine this to be
an iterative process, perhaps short of the ideal of full transparency, but a marked
improvement over the reality of the black-box approach that OIRA currently
maintains. Because OIRA is already reporting annually to Congress on the
benefits and costs of federal regulatory activity,227 these reports could contain
some self-reflective sections on the developing common law within the office,
disclosing to agencies and the public what the law of the office looks like.
Indeed, several recent “regleprudential moments” recommend themselves as
models for reform at OIRA more generally. First, when President Obama
undertook to craft his own executive orders that were to control the work of
OIRA, he did not simply promulgate them after consulting only with personal
advisors, White House Counsel, or OLC. Rather, Obama “directed the Director
of OMB, in consultation with regulatory agencies, to produce a set of recommendations for a new executive order on federal regulatory review within 100 days,
followed by an unusual request for public comments on the same subject.
Almost 200 public comments were received.”228 Although there are some
meaningful ways that the Bush Administration’s OIRA under John Graham was
more transparent than what became of Obama’s OIRA in his first term—the
repository is a much better window into Graham’s OIRA than it is into
Sunstein’s OIRA—Obama understood that importing a public comment process
into trans-substantive regulatory review itself could be salutary and promote
rule-of-law values.
But Bush’s OMB also understood the benefit of notice and comment for the
details of trans-substantive regulatory review. To wit, when OMB issued its
“Peer Review Bulletin” on December 16, 2004, it responded to 243 comments
over two comment periods.229 And when OMB issued its “Final Bulletin for

226. See supra note 82.
227. See OIRA Reports to Congress, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/info
reg_regpol_reports_congress (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). These reports, issued pursuant to the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act, focus on the benefits and costs of federal regulation. Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. C, § 624, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-161 to -162 (2000). They supply
both aggregate benefit and cost information, as well as analyses of individual rules. These reports,
however, are not focused at all on the substance of the rules at issue and shed little light on the
questions pertinent to regleprudence.
228. JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 28–29 (5th ed. 2012) (footnotes
omitted).
229. LUBBERS, supra note 148, at 35–36.
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Agency Good Guidance Practices” on January 18, 2007, it responded to thirtyone comments from diverse public and private stakeholders.230 Or perhaps
even more importantly, when OMB issued Circular A-4 on September 17, 2003,
guidance that defines good regulatory analysis for the entire administrative
state, it had subjected drafts to public comment, interagency review, and peer
review.231
In short, OIRA could more regularly commit to taking a page out of President
Obama’s and OMB’s playbook, subjecting at least its quasi-rulemaking to
more transparent notice-and-comment processes. It is perhaps ironic to recommend that the notice-and-comment police ought to be subject to the same kind
of processes they are supposed to be encouraging others to improve. But it
somehow seems just right, too.
3. Costs of the Rule of Law at OIRA
Were OIRA to commit to public reason-giving and a greater respect for
consistency in regulatory review, it is certainly likely that such reforms would
render more costly and time consuming a process that is already a symbol of the
ossification of the administrative state.232 By all appearances, OIRA is currently
incapable of meeting the deadlines set by Executive Order 12,866;233 even a
relatively periodic accounting of the basis for its decisions might burden
regulatory review to the breaking point.234
The kind of commitment to rule-of-law values we advocate, however, need
not radically change the nature of OIRA’s case-by-case oversight, even if we
envision fairly significant structural changes to how those reviews are memorialized and communicated.235 The substance of what is communicated to agencies
need not have the formality and depth of a judicial opinion in order to apprise
agencies of the reasoned basis for decisionmaking and, again, there are relatively simple ways to capture the office’s common law development in specific
domains over time.236
To the extent that OIRA’s resistance to meeting the transparency mandates
of Executive Order 12,866 derives from a too-burdensome docket, there is a
230. Memorandum from Rob Portman, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts
and Agencies, Issuance of OMB’s “Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices” (Jan. 18,
2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-07.pdf.
231. See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 93.
232. Cf. McGarity, supra note 19.
233. See supra note 85.
234. If OIRA was born in the Paperwork Reduction Act, see supra note 3, we can certainly acknowledge the further irony of advocating that OIRA produce, well, more paperwork.
235. On one level, though, in suggesting that OIRA hew at a minimum to the ignored transparency
mandates of Executive Order 12,866, we are in some ways advocating a return to norms envisioned
when the current structure of regulatory review was first articulated.
236. Just as there are summary judicial dispositions, there may be contexts where nonprecedential or
even essentially per curiam-like cursory statements simply noting the fact of review may continue to be
appropriate. However, that would at least provide some accounting for the relative importance and
precedential value of a given pronouncement.
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simple institutional answer. OIRA could retreat from the outsized gatekeeping
role it currently performs and recommit to the original scope of its jurisdiction
under the Executive Order. Or it could limit full regulatory review to only the
most economically significant rules. Certainly this raises the basic Weberian
implausibility of a bureaucratic institution ceding power, but that should not
deter us. There are good reasons—tied to OIRA’s lawmaking role we have
identified here—to focus OIRA’s resources on the most significant of agency
actions, as originally contemplated in a more modest era of regulatory review.
A separate concern with a commitment to a more rule-of-law-inflected practice at OIRA might be that exposing the inner workings of the office would chill
deliberation and candor within the Executive Branch. To the extent that OIRA
commits to articulating and publicly accounting for its views in the course of
regulatory review, staff and officials involved may hesitate to provide their
most incisive input. We are not, however, suggesting that a commitment by
OIRA to consistency and transparency would have to violate important deliberative norms. One could analogize, in fact, to the work of judges on panels
deliberating in confidence or judges discussing cases in chambers with their
clerks in the process of drafting opinions. What matters in that context is the
final decision, not the negotiation that produced the decision. We are thus
suggesting a corrective to the current public silence that overwhelmingly pervades the process of regulatory review.
IV. REGLEPRUDENCE BEYOND OIRA
Although we have focused regleprudential attention upon OIRA’s lawmaking
functions, our themes have the potential to apply to a much broader swath of
the infrastructure of the regulatory state. In this Part, we outline a variety of
other contexts ripe for regleprudential inquiry. We then conclude by outlining
a research agenda that can highlight how this project connects with mainline
jurisprudential concerns.
A. THE BEYOND

Scholars have paid increasing attention in recent years to the reality of the
breadth of lawmaking activity within the Executive Branch. But this work has
largely focused on the most visibly legal aspects of the phenomenon. Some
have, for example, explored the President’s structural role in separation of
powers, the interplay between final regulatory action and judicial review, and
even those aspects of the internal functioning of the Executive Branch that are
most clearly legally oriented, such as work of the Office of Legal Counsel.237

237. Beyond Trevor Morrison’s recent work on stare decisis in OLC, see Morrison, supra note 2,
there is some literature developing on lawmaking within the Executive Branch. See, e.g., Trevor W.
Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006);
Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office of Legal
Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1303–04 (2000) (“The relative inattention to the executive branch as
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These are important grounds of inquiry, but they risk obscuring a number of
important institutional practices within the Executive Branch that, like OIRA’s
regulatory review, are lawmaking processes that are routinely overlooked as
such.238
To take one example, the practice of presidents issuing statements when
signing legislation has erupted into a source of much controversy in recent
years.239 Although the practice has deep roots,240 presidential signing statements have in recent administrations become a significant vehicle not only to
register publicly the Executive’s interpretation of newly enacted legislation—
and voice reservations about statutes—but also to direct officials in how to act
in enforcing such legislation.241 Signing statements can be subject to a similar
kind of administration-wide interagency review as regulatory actions242 and
often involve significant and controversial questions of law.243 All of the
questions that we have asked of OIRA are relevant in this context: What is the
force of stare decisis when presidents consider past signing statements (or other
sources of executive precedent) in the course of promulgating succeeding
statements? How should presidents balance the value of minimizing decision
costs, promoting consistency, focusing coordination, and respecting reliance,
with the democratic mandate reflected in the political reality of changing
administrations? What process might improve the legitimacy of such signing
statements when they have practical legal effect?
A perhaps even more significant arena of independent executive lawmaking
can be found in foreign affairs. As Harold Koh has argued from personal
experience serving as Legal Adviser at the State Department, the President has

an expositor of the law is striking given the extraordinary breadth and significance of executive branch
legal interpretation.”); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355 (2012); see
also Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
123 (1994).
238. To be clear, we are not arguing that legal domains within the Executive Branch that are the
subject of traditional administrative law are beyond examination through the lens of regleprudence. We
are merely focusing on institutions within the Executive Branch that have not generally been subject to
direct and routine judicial review.
239. See generally Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The Presidential Signing Statements Controversy, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11 (2007).
240. See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33667, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (2012) (noting that “Presidents have issued such statements
since the Monroe Administration”).
241. See Cass & Strauss, supra note 239, at 18 (“Signing statements can be used within an
administration to help resolve disputable questions of interpretation. There are many different executive
officials who might have a hand in the implementation, and therefore the interpretation, of statutory
instructions. A signing statement provides the President’s direction on which interpretive turn to take.”);
see also Steven G. Calabresi, Mark E. Berghausen & Skylar Albertson, The Rise and Fall of the
Separation of Powers, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 527, 538 n.54 (2012) (discussing signing statements as
lawmaking when they bind Executive Branch actors).
242. See Cass & Strauss, supra note 239, at 14 (noting the “wide consultation within the executive
branch” that precedes the promulgation of signing statements).
243. See generally GARVEY, supra note 240 (providing an overview of the substance of signing
statements since the Reagan Administration).
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the authority not only to “enter a binding international agreement based on his
own independent, Article II authorities, without action from Congress,”244 but
also to undertake international agreements that have significant legal consequences in the interstices of existing statutory authority.245 Indeed, when the
State Department is overseeing any process of treaty making, it engages in an
administration-wide review process with significant legal dimensions.246 As
Koh has described the process:
[It] is exhaustive and designed to ensure that all proposed U.S. international
agreements—even if concluded by a different agency—are subject to a rigorous legal and policy review by the State Department before being negotiated
and concluded. Through this process, the State Department plays the same
kind of clearinghouse role with respect to international agreements that the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) plays with regard to federal
regulations.247

In all of this, as with OIRA’s work, it is legitimate to ask about the potentially
variable force of precedent along dimensions such as the formality of the
international agreement as well as how norms of reason-giving, transparency,
and accountability might operate when the President unilaterally makes foreign
affairs law.
Likewise, much of what the Executive Branch is charged with under the
President’s Article II “Take Care” mandate classically involves enforcement of
statutory law.248 Even in this task, new law is often made (in effect) both
through the exercise of executive discretion and through the acts and interpretation that actually occur in the process of enforcement.249 This exercise of

244. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Twenty-First-Century International
Lawmaking (Oct. 17, 2012), Remarks for the 33rd Thomas F. Ryan Lecture, in 101 GEO. L.J. 725, 732
(2013). This brand of executive lawmaking, Koh argues, is of a species with a broader practice he
describes as “quasi-constitutional custom,” which is “a widespread and consistent practice of Executive
Branch activity that Congress, by its conduct, has essentially accepted.” Id. at 733. For a somewhat
contrary view, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law,
118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1789 (2009) (“[T]he President may not, through his foreign affairs executive
power, make new domestic law. He can make a treaty. He can negotiate an executive agreement
implemented by legislation within Congress’s power. But he can no more make law on his own,
through the exercise of the foreign affairs aspect of ‘the executive Power,’ than he can legislate on his
own.” (footnote omitted)).
245. Koh, supra note 244, at 733–34 (giving the recent example of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, a multilateral intellectual property pact); see also id. at 738 (noting that the Executive
Branch engages in lawmaking through the development of customary international law).
246. Id. at 734 (noting that the State Department’s “lawmaking practice is not limited to joining
treaties and other agreements; we spend just as much time ensuring the U.S. is in a position to comply
with its international obligations”).
247. Id. at 735.
248. See generally Andrias, supra note 76.
249. See generally Joseph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing
Federal Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619 (2012).
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executive discretion is just as often shielded from meaningful judicial review.250
Enforcement, no less than the quasi-statutory realm of the regulatory process,
can be evaluated for how precedent is deployed, how executive institutions
approach horizontal and vertical coordination, and how rule-of-law values
beyond stare decisis might improve executive action. All regleprudential questions.251
And these questions are equally pertinent to executive action through deal
making, a mode of governance that has become increasingly important, particularly in the wake of the recent economic crisis.252 Notably, Congress
authorized a $700 billion program that allowed the Treasury Department (and,
through separate authority, the Federal Reserve) to intervene in a large number
of private firms.253 As Steven Davidoff and David Zaring have argued, this
signature set of policies was shaped significantly by legal constraints and
simultaneously pressed the outer limits of authority at two institutions arguably
“least constrained by the law.”254 A regleprudential approach to this increasingly significant aspect of executive activity could offer ways to respond to the
concerns the practice raises, providing appropriate institutional constraints
grounded in rule-of-law values even in the absence of meaningful judicial
oversight.
In all of these institutional domains, and many others within the Executive
Branch,255 regleprudence has tremendous potential to raise—and hopefully
answer—questions about lawmaking functions that have received far too little
attention. Those insights, in turn, can draw on the rich tradition of jurisprudence
to understand the administrative state, just as legisprudence has sought to
illuminate the legislative domain of lawmaking. There is a path to appreciating
limits within these areas of law that are not born just of politics or conventions.
Legality itself contains the seeds of constraint.

250. Id. at 629–42 (offering examples of executive discretion in practice).
251. Indeed, Kate Andrias has advocated for a coordinating mechanism within the White House
bureaucracy that would function for enforcement in ways that are not dissimilar to how OIRA oversees
regulatory review. See Andrias, supra note 76, at 1077–1107. Were such a coordination mechanism to
be adopted, it would no doubt pose the same kinds of legal-interpretive oversight challenges that OIRA
raises, and our regleprudential inquiry into OIRA would be directly relevant.
252. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to
the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 468 (2009) (noting that “while administrative law scholars
spend much of their time thinking about how the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court might review
government administrative decisions, it is worth noting that the response to the financial crisis has had
nothing to do with the courts”).
253. Id. at 513–18; see also Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 437 (2011)
(outlining the breadth of deal-like responses by a variety of federal agencies).
254. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 252, at 466 (discussing the Treasury Department and the Federal
Reserve).
255. See supra note 69 (outlining other Executive Branch structures performing legal interpretive
work in the interstices of administrative practice).
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B. WHAT IS LAW, AGAIN?

This leads us back to what might be considered some foundational questions
for a new regleprudence: What is law within the administrative state? What
conditions determine the validity of that legal authority? Questions like these
have long been the animating concerns of jurisprudence and legisprudence, and
they are equally important for Executive Branch lawmaking—what we might
call, with apologies to John Austin—the province of regleprudence.256
In some basic sense, then, arguing for a regleprudence is an invitation to
engage the philosophical tradition of jurisprudence and apply its insights to the
inner workings of the administrative state.257 Which is not to say that this is the
place for a full exploration of how the many debates that animate jurisprudence
might play out for the kinds of Executive Branch institutions on which we have
focused. Instead, it is enough to recognize the relevance of such debates to a
future research agenda for regleprudence. After all, not one of the three major
compendia of work on jurisprudence and the philosophy of law has an entry on
the administrative state (or even administrative law).258
Still, we offer a final word on some of what has passed for a jurisprudence of
the administrative state. In light of the relatively recent interest in how the
administrative state responds to emergencies, theorists have investigated and
analyzed “black holes” and “grey holes” that permit a form of action by the
Executive seemingly outside the legal order.259 “Black holes” are areas where
the law is thought to have a gap that essentially permits unbridled discretion for
the Executive to act without judicial oversight; “grey holes” are areas where the
legal order uses such flexible constraints over the Executive that there is
effectively unbridled discretion, even though judges maintain the façade of
judicial oversight.260
However, philosophers of law are not arguing about the ways in which
these holes reveal different pockets of legal ordering that have their own
commitments to legal regularity and validity—what regleprudence would de-

256. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rumble
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832).
257. We have made assumptions throughout this Article about some important aspects of how those
debates might play out. For example, we have made a normative argument for applying certain core
rule-of-law values to OIRA; but a scholar of jurisprudence in a Hartian vein could reasonably respond
with a positivist critique of this approach, questioning whether such values have any necessary role in
regleprudence. Cf. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994). We obviously feel that there is a
basis for our particular normative approach, but we recognize that judgment probably requires more
argument.
258. See A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, at v–viii (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1996); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, at vii–viii (Jules Coleman &
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, at ix–xii (Andrei Marmor
ed., 2012).
259. See, e.g., DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 160
(2006); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1102 (2009).
260. See Evan J. Criddle, Mending Holes in the Rule of (Administrative) Law, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
1271, 1271–72 (2010).
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mand. They are not, moreover, proposing a legal order without judicial enforcement as its centerpiece, as regleprudence would recognize. Rather, jurisprudential
debates are largely about how disputes about executive discretion may or may
not be controlled by judges and/or legislatures.261
These debates skirt the core project of what we would hope to see in a field of
regleprudence. Instead of focusing on the ways the judiciary can be brought to
bear on executive action and deciding whether the Executive has lived up to
judicially enforceable administrative law, regleprudence can illuminate ways the
Executive can grow to appreciate the kind of law it is making, developing, and
adhering to over time, even without the shadow of judicial enforcement.
Perhaps what we are offering, then, is just another Fullerian project of discovering an “internal morality of law,” delineating features of legality—like
stare decisis, consistency, reason-giving, transparency262—but one retooled for
the modern administrative state. We are pushing back against an old instinct that
is routinely attributed to A.V. Dicey, who saw all of administrative law as
conceptually inconsistent with the rule of law, who resisted any jurisprudence of
the administrative state.263 This old instinct even reveals itself in Fuller. Consider Ed Rubin on Fuller:
On reflection, the problem is that Fuller has not stated principles that apply to
law in general, and reflect its internal morality, but rather principles that apply
to the way the state controls the conduct of its citizens through transitive
statutes—in other words, to the same traditional, pre-administrative category
of enactments that positivists regard as law.264

Thus Fuller, although framing his inquiry by investigating a king lawgiver
Rex—an executive par excellence—still “embodies the basic idea that when
the state imposes burdens on a specific person, it must do so through some sort
of adjudication.”265
In the generations since Fuller, the field of jurisprudence continues mostly
to theorize about law as that which is implemented in courts, not as binding
principles that work themselves out over time within the Executive Branch
itself. Rex may be King—but he has morphed into Hercules the Judge within
mainstream jurisprudence.266 This is not to say that all jurisprudence is adjudication-focused—there is no doubt work on legislation, international law, and law

261. See generally id.
262. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
263. See A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 329 (10th ed.
1959); A. V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW & PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 256 (1905). For a more nuanced account of Dicey’s views about administrative
law, see John A. Rohr, Dicey’s Ghost and Administrative Law, 34 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 8 (2002).
264. RUBIN, supra note 30, at 218.
265. Id.
266. One might attribute to Dworkin’s success in jurisprudence—and his focus on adjudication—the
loss of the Fullerian focus on Rex as king. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); Ronald
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outside courts—but it remains true that the philosophy of law has not focused
much energy on accounting for the ways regulations, ordinances, administrative
practice, executive orders, and regulatory review must be accommodated by the
concept of law. We hope our introduction to regleprudence here inspires more
work along these lines.
CONCLUSION
This Article calls for a new approach to analyzing the legal function at the
heart of the administrative state through what we have called regleprudence: the
“systematic analysis of regulation refracted through accounts of the role and
nature of law.”267 We have focused on OIRA as a quintessential example of the
kind of lawmaking institution internal to the Executive Branch that is rarely
conceived of in terms of legality. As we discussed, OIRA clearly interprets and
makes law in the course of its regulatory review, and it is important to
understand this legal function through a lens that is attuned to the conceptual
and practical consequences of this role.
A commitment to regleprudence, however, can illustrate that concerns about
the sources and legitimacy of the law, the force of precedent, and myriad other
aspects of legality may apply to the entire superstructure (and substructure) of
administration. Administrative law has certainly long grappled with how the
judiciary should respond to the regulatory state. But law is intrinsic to so much
more of the functioning of the Executive Branch than traditional accounts have
allowed, and a research agenda in regleprudence can provide a frame for a
deeper conceptual and practical engagement with that reality.

Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law—Observations Prompted by Professor Fuller’s Novel Claim,
113 U. PA. L. REV. 668 (1965).
267. See supra text accompanying note 4.

